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Abstract
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and de-
tailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or
difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often primarily interested in enforcing a desired target flow
as the equilibrium by suitably influencing player behavior in the routing game. We ask whether
one can achieve target flows as equilibria without knowing the underlying latency functions.
Our main result gives a crisp positive answer to this question. We show that, under fairly
general settings, one can efficiently compute edge tolls that induce a given target multicommodity
flow in a nonatomic routing game using a polynomial number of queries to an oracle that takes
candidate tolls as input and returns the resulting equilibrium flow. This result is obtained via a
novel application of the ellipsoid method. Our algorithm extends easily to many other settings,
such as (i) when certain edges cannot be tolled or there is an upper bound on the total toll paid
by a user, and (ii) general nonatomic congestion games. We obtain tighter bounds on the query
complexity for series-parallel networks, and single-commodity routing games with linear latency
functions, and complement these with a query-complexity lower bound. We also obtain strong
positive results for Stackelberg routing to achieve target equilibria in series-parallel graphs.
Our results build upon various new techniques that we develop pertaining to the computation
of, and connections between, different notions of approximate equilibrium; properties of mul-
ticommodity flows and tolls in series-parallel graphs; and sensitivity of equilibrium flow with
respect to tolls. Our results demonstrate that one can indeed circumvent the potentially-onerous
task of modeling latency functions, and yet obtain meaningful results for the underlying routing
game.
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1 Introduction
Network routing games are a popular means of modeling settings where a collection of self-interested,
uncoordinated users or agents route their traffic along an underlying network—prominent examples
include communication and transportation networks—and have been extensively studied from various
perspectives in the Transportation Science and Computer Science literature; see, e.g., [34, 2, 23, 24,
11, 17, 36, 37, 33], and the references therein. These games are typically described in terms of an
underlying directed graph G = (V,E) modeling the network, a set of commodities specified by
source-sink pairs and the volume of traffic routed between them modeling the different user-types,
and latency functions or delay functions (l∗e : R+ 7→ R+)e∈E on the edges, with l∗e(x) modeling
the delay experienced on edge e when volume x of traffic is routed along it. The outcome of users’
strategic behavior is described by the notion of an equilibrium traffic pattern, wherein no user may
unilaterally deviate and reduce her total delay.
The typical means of mathematically investigating network routing games takes the above speci-
fication as input, and thus, assumes, right at the onset, that one has precise, detailed information about
the underlying latency functions. However, such precise information may be unavailable or hard to
obtain, especially in large systems, without engaging in a highly non-trivial and potentially-expensive
modeling task. In fact, the task of capturing observed delays via suitable delay functions is a topic of
much research in itself in fields such as queuing theory and transportation science. Recognizing that
the modeling task of obtaining suitable latency functions is often really a means to facilitating a math-
ematical analysis of the underlying routing game, we ask whether one can sidestep this potentially-
demanding task and analyze the routing game without knowing the underlying latency functions. This
is the question that motivates our work.
In routing games, there is often a central authority who has some limited ability to influence
agents’ behavior by making suitable changes to the routing game, e.g., imposing tolls on the network
edges. This influence can be used to alleviate the detrimental effects of selfish agent behavior, which
might be expressed both in terms of the agents’ costs (i.e., price of anarchy) and externalities not
captured by these (e.g., pollution costs in a road network). Thus, a natural and well-studied goal in
network routing games is to induce a desirable target traffic pattern as an equilibrium by suitably
influencing agents’ behavior. Such a target traffic pattern may be obtained by, e.g., limiting the traffic
on every edge to a fraction of its capacity, or reducing the traffic near hospitals and schools. It is
evident here that suitably modeling the latency functions is only a means to the end goal of achieving
the target traffic pattern. Our work aims to shed light on the following question: can one achieve this
end without the means?
1.1 Our contributions
We initiate a systematic study of network routing games from the perspective of achieving target
equilibria without knowing the latency functions. We introduce a query model for network routing
games to study such questions, and obtain bounds on the query complexity of various tasks in this
model.
The query model. We are explicitly given the underlying network G = (V,E), the set of com-
modities specified by the source-sink pairs and the demands to be routed between them, and the target
multicommodity flow f∗ that we seek to achieve. We do not, however, know the underlying latency
functions (l∗e)e∈E . Instead, the only information that we can glean about the latency functions is via
queries to a black box or oracle (e.g., simulation procedure) that outputs the equilibrium flow under
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a specified stimulus to the routing game. We investigate two methods for influencing agent behavior
that have been considered extensively in the literature, which gives rise to two types of queries.
We primarily focus on the task of computing edge tolls to induce f∗ (Sections 3 and 5.1). This
yields the following query model: each query consists of a vector of tolls on the edges, and returns
the equilibrium flow that results upon imposing these tolls. The goal is to minimize the number of
queries required to compute tolls that yield f∗ as the equilibrium.
We also explore, in Sections 4 and 5.2, the use of Stackelberg routing to induce f∗. Here, we
control an α fraction of the total traffic volume. Each query is a Stackelberg routing, which is a
flow of volume at most α times the total volume, and returns the equilibrium flow under this Stack-
elberg routing. The goal is to minimize the number of queries required to compute a Stackelberg
routing that induces f∗ as the equilibrium.
Our results and techniques. Our main result is a crisp and rather sweeping positive result showing
that one can always obtain tolls that induce a given target flow f∗ with a polynomial number of queries
(Section 3.1). With linear latency functions, our algorithm computes tolls that enforce f∗ exactly
(Theorem 3.2). With more general latency functions, such as convex polynomial functions, equilibria
may be irrational, so it is not meaningful to assume that a query returns the exact equilibrium. Instead,
we assume that each query returns a (suitably-defined) approximate equilibrium and obtain tolls that
enforce a flow that is component-wise close to f∗ (Theorem 3.6).
The chief technical novelty underlying these results is an unconventional application of the ellip-
soid method. We view the problem as one where we are searching for the (parameters of the) true
latency functions l∗ and tolls that induce f∗. It is information-theoretically impossible, however, to
identify l∗ (or even get close to it) in the query model since,—as is the case even when G is a single
edge—there may be no way of distinguishing two sets of latency functions. The key insight is that,
notwithstanding this difficulty, if the current candidate tolls τ do not enforce f∗, then one can use
the resulting equilibrium flow to identify a hyperplane that separates our current candidate (l, τ) from
the true tuple (l∗, τ∗). This enables one to use the machinery of the ellipsoid method to obtain tolls
enforcing f∗ in a polynomial number of queries.
Our ellipsoid-method based algorithm is quite versatile and can be easily adapted to handle var-
ious generalizations (Section 3.2). For instance, we can incorporate any linear constraints that tolls
inducing f∗ must satisfy, which one can separate over. This captures constraints where we disallow
tolls on certain edges, or place an upper bound on the total toll paid by an agent. All our machinery
extends seamlessly to the more-general setting of nonatomic congestion games. Finally, another no-
table extension is to the setting of atomic routing games under the assumption that the equilibrium is
unique.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we devise algorithms with substantially improved query complexity for (a)
multicommodity routing games on series-parallel (sepa) networks, and (b) single-commodity routing
games on general networks, both with linear latency functions. For (a), we exploit the combinatorial
structure of sepa graphs to design an algorithm with near-linear query complexity. We show that any
toll-vector in a sepa graph can be converted into a simpler canonical form, which can be equivalently
viewed in terms of certain labelings of the subgraphs of the sepa graph obtained via parallel joins;
leveraging this yields an algorithm with near-linear query complexity. Our algorithm works more
generally whenever we have an oracle that returns the (exact) equilibrium. For (b), we prove that
(roughly speaking) the equilibrium flow is a linear function of tolls, and use linear algebra to infer the
constants defining this linear map in O˜(|E|2) queries.
Complementing these upper bounds, we prove an Ω(|E|) lower bound (Theorem 5.1) on the query
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complexity of computing tolls that induce a target flow, even for single-commodity routing games on
parallel-link graphs with linear delays. This almost matches the query complexity of our algorithm
for sepa graphs.
En route to obtaining the above results, we prove various results that provide new insights into
network routing games even in the standard non-black-box model where latency functions are known.
For instance, we obtain results on: (a) the computation of approximate equilibria and their properties
(Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5); (b) structural properties of tolls and multicommodity flows in sepa graphs
(Section 3.3); and (c) sensitivity of equilibrium flow with respect to tolls (Theorem 3.18). We believe
that these results and the machinery we develop to obtain them are of independent interest and likely
to find various applications.
In Section 4, we investigate the use of Stackelberg routing to induce a given target flow. Stackel-
berg routing turns out to be significantly harder to leverage than edge tolls in the query model. This
is perhaps not surprising given that designing effective Stackelberg routing strategies turns out to be
a much-more difficult proposition than computing suitable edge tolls, even in the standard non-black-
box setting where latency functions are given (see, e.g., [26, 5]). Nevertheless, we build upon the ma-
chinery that we develop for sepa graphs to give a rather efficient and general combinatorial algorithm
that finds the desired Stackelberg routing using at most |E| queries to an oracle returning equilibrium
flows. This applies to any strictly increasing latency functions, and in particular, to linear latency
functions. (Observe that this query complexity is even better than our query-complexity bound for
inducing flows via tolls on sepa graphs.) Moreover, our algorithm determines the Stackelberg routing
of smallest volume that can induce f∗.
We obtain various lower bounds in Section 5.2 that allude to the difficulty of computing a Stack-
elberg routing in general networks that induces a target flow. One possible strategy for finding such a
Stackelberg routing is to use the queries to infer an (approximately) “equivalent” set of delay functions
l, in the sense that any Stackelberg routing yields the same (or almost the same) resulting equilibrium
under the two sets of delay functions. Then, since given the latency functions, it is easy to compute a
Stackelberg routing that induces a target flow (see Lemma 2.2), one can find the desired Stackelberg
routing. Theorem 5.5 shows that such an approach cannot work: in the query model, any algorithm
that learns even an approximately equivalent set of delay functions must make an exponential number
of queries. Theorem 5.8 proves an orthogonal computational lower bound showing that determining
the equivalence of two given sets of latency functions is an NP-hard problem. As in the case of tolls,
along the way, we uncover a new result about the hardness of Stackelberg routing. We show that
the problem of finding a Stackelberg routing that minimizes the average delay of the remaining equi-
librium flow is NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than 4/3 (Theorem 5.11). The query
complexity of finding a Stackelberg routing in general networks that induces a target flow remains an
interesting open question for further research.
Our results on tolls and Stackelberg routing demonstrate that it is indeed possible to circumvent
the potentially-onerous task of modeling latency functions, and yet obtain meaningful results for the
underlying routing game. Our array of upper- and lower- bound results indicate the richness of the
query model, and suggest a promising direction for further research.
1.2 Related work
Network routing/congestion games with nonatomic players—where each player controls an infinitesi-
mal amount of traffic and there is a continuum of players—were first formally studied in the context of
road traffic by Wardrop [34], and the equilibrium notion in such games is known as Wardrop equilib-
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rium after him. Network routing games have since been widely studied in the fields of Transportation
Science, Operations Research, and Computer Science; see, e.g., the monographs [23, 24] and the
references therein. We limit ourselves to a survey of the results relevant to our work.
Equilibria are known to exist in network routing games, even with atomic players with split-
table flow [22]. Nonatomic equilibria are known to be essentially unique, but this is not the case
for atomic splittable routing games, where uniqueness criteria were recently obtained by Bhaskar et
al. [3]. Equilibria in routing games are known to be inefficient, and considerable research in algo-
rithmic game theory has focused on quantifying this inefficiency in terms of the price of anarchy
(PoA) [18, 20] of the game, which measures, for a given objective, the worst-case ratio between the
objective values of an equilibrium and the optimal solution. A celebrated result of Roughgarden [25],
and Roughgarden and Tardos [30] gives tight bounds on the PoA for nonatomic routing games for
the social welfare objective. Recently, similar results were obtained for the PoA in atomic splittable
routing games [13, 29].
Given the inefficiency of equilibria, researchers have investigated ways of influencing player be-
havior so as to alleviate this inefficiency. The most common techniques studied to influence player
behavior in network congestion games are the imposition of tolls on the network edges, and Stackel-
berg routing. Network tolls are a classical means of congestion control, dating back to Pigou [21], and
various results have demonstrated their effectiveness for both nonatomic routing [2, 6, 11, 17, 36] and
atomic splittable routing [33, 37] showing that any minimal flow (in particular, an optimal flow) can be
enforced via suitable efficiently-computable tolls. Stackelberg routing has also been well studied, and
it is known that this is much-less effective in reducing the PoA. Whereas they can help in reducing the
PoA to a constant for certain network topologies such as parallel-link graphs [26] and series-parallel
graphs [33], it is known that this is not possible for general graphs [5]. Furthermore, it is known that
it is NP-hard to compute the Stackelberg routing that minimizes the total cost at equilibrium, even for
parallel-link graphs with linear delay functions [26]; a PTAS is known [19] for parallel-link graphs.
All of these results pertain to the setting where one is given the latency functions.
To our knowledge, our query model has not been studied in the literature. It is useful to contrast
our query model with work in empirical game theory, which also studies games when players’ costs
are not explicitly given. In empirical game theory, each query specifies a (pure or mixed) strategy-
profile, and returns the (expected) cost of each player under this strategy profile. In contrast, in
our query model, we observe the equilibrium flow instead of individual player delays. This is more
natural in the setting of routing games: in the absence of knowledge of the latency functions, one
may only be able to calculate player delays under a strategy profile by routing players along the
stipulated paths (and then observing player delays); but this may be infeasible since one cannot in fact
impose routes on self-interested players. Moreover, whereas our goal is to obtain a desirable outcome
as the equilibrium, the focus in empirical game theory is to compute an (approximate) equilibrium.
Generic approaches to generate strategy-profiles for this purpose, and examples where these have
proved useful are discussed by Wellman [35]. An oblivious algorithm that does not depend on player
utilities, and instead uses best-responses to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in bimatrix games was
given by Sureka and Wurman [32]. Starting with [28], various papers have studied the complexity of
computing an exact or approximate correlated equilibrium in multi-player games using both pure- and
mixed-strategy queries [1, 14, 15]. More recently, Fearnley et al. [9] study algorithms in the empirical-
game-theory model for bimatrix games, congestion games, and graphical games, and obtain various
bounds on the number of queries required for equilibrium computation.
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2 Preliminaries and notation
A nonatomic routing game (or simply a routing game) is denoted by a tuple Γ = (G, l,K), where
G = (V,E) is a directed graph with m edges and n nodes, l = (le)e∈E is a vector of latency or delay
functions on the edges of the graph, and K = {(si, ti, di)}i≤k is a set of k triples denoting sources,
sinks, and demands for k commodities. The delay function le : R+ 7→ R+ gives the delay on edge e
as a function of the total flow on the edge. (Here, R+ is the set of nonnegative reals.) We assume that
le is continuous, and strictly increasing. For each commodity i, the demand di specifies the volume
of flow that is routed from si to ti by self-interested agents, each of whom controls an infinitesimal
amount of flow and selects an si-ti path as her strategy. The strategies selected by the agents thus
induce a multicommodity flow (f i)i≤k, where each f i = (f ie)e∈E is an si-ti flow of value di. That is,
the vector f i = (f ie)e satisfies:
f i ≥ 0,
∑
(v,w)∈E
f ivw −
∑
(u,v)∈E
f iuv = 0 ∀v ∈ V \ {si, ti},
∑
(s,w)∈E
f isw −
∑
(u,s)∈E
f ius = di.
We call f = (f i)i≤k a feasible flow. We say that f is acyclic if {e : f ie > 0} is acyclic for every
commodity i. We overload notation and use f to also denote the total-flow vector f =
∑
i≤k f
i
. For
a path P , we use fP > 0 to denote fe > 0 for all e ∈ P . We sometimes refer to
⋃
i{si, ti} as the
terminals of the routing game or multicommodity flow. Given an s-t flow f , we use |f | to denote the
value of f .
Let Pi denote the collection of all si-ti paths. Given a multicommodity flow (f i)i≤k induced by
the agents’ strategies, the delay of an agent that selects an si-ti path P is the total delay, lP (f) :=∑
e∈P le(fe), incurred on the edges of P . Each agent in a routing game seeks to minimize her own
delay. To analyze the resulting strategic behavior, we focus on the concept of a Nash equilibrium,
which is a profile of agents’ strategies where no individual agent can reduce her delay by changing
her strategy, assuming other agents do not change their strategies. In routing games, this is formalized
by the notion of Wardrop equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. A multicommodity flow fˆ is a Wardrop equilibrium (or simply an equilibrium) of a
routing game Γ if it is feasible and for every commodity i, and all paths P , Q ∈ Pi with fˆ iP > 0,
we have lP (fˆ) ≤ lQ(fˆ). A Wardrop equilibrium can be computed by solving the following convex
program:
min Φ(f) :=
∑
e
∫ fe
0
le(x) dx s.t. f =
k∑
i=1
f i, f i is an si-ti flow of value di ∀i = 1, . . . , k.
(1)
Given a routing game Γ and a feasible flow f , define Di(l, f) := minP∈Pi lP (f) for each com-
modity i, and call an edge e a shortest-path edge for commodity i with respect to f if e lies on some
path P ∈ Pi such that lP (f) = Di(l, f). Let Si(l, f) be the set of shortest-path edges for commodity
i with respect to f .
Tolls, Stackelberg routing, and our query model. We investigate both the use of edge tolls and
Stackelberg routing to induce a given target flow. Tolls are additional costs on the edges that are paid
by every player that uses the edge. A vector of tolls τ = (τe)e ∈ RE+ on the network edges thus
changes the delay function on each edge e to lτe (x) := le(x) + τe, and so the delay of an agent who
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chooses P is now lP (f) + τ(P ), where τ(P ) :=
∑
e∈P τe. We use f(l, τ) to denote the equilib-
rium flow obtained with delay functions l = (le)e and tolls τ = (τe)e. We say that τ enforces a
multicommodity flow f with latency functions l if the total flow f(l, τ)e = fe on every edge e.
For Stackelberg routing, in keeping with much of the literature, we focus on single-commodity
routing games. Given a single-commodity routing game Γ = (G, l, (s, t, d)) and a parameter α ∈
[0, 1], a central authority controls at most an α-fraction of the total s-t flow-volume d and routes this
flow in any desired way, and then the remaining traffic routes itself selfishly. That is, a Stackelberg
routing g is an s-t flow of value at most αd, which we call the Stackelberg demand. The Stackelberg
routing g modifies the delay function on each edge e to l˜e(g;x) := le(x+ge). The remaining (1−α)d
volume of traffic routes itself according to a Wardrop equilibrium, denoted by f(l, g), of the instance
(G, l˜, (1 − α)d). The total flow induced by a Stackelberg routing g is thus g + f(l, g).
We shorten f(l, τ) to f(τ), and f(l, g) to f(g) when l is clear from the context.
In our query model, we are given the graph G, the commodity set K = {(si, ti, di)}i≤k, and a
feasible target multicommodity flow f∗. There is an underlying routing game Γ = (G, l∗,K), to which
we are given query access. If our method of influencing equilibria is via tolls, then the oracle takes
a toll-vector τ as input and returns the equilibrium flow f(l∗, τ) or a (suitably-defined) approximate
equilibrium. Our goal is to minimize the number of queries required to compute tolls τ∗ such that
f(l∗, τ∗) = f∗.
If our method of influencing equilibria is via Stackelberg routing, then we are also given the
parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. Each query takes a Stackelberg routing g with |g| ≤ αd as input and returns
the flow f(l∗, g). Our goal is to minimize the number of queries required to compute a Stackelberg
routing g∗ of value at most αd such that f(l∗, g∗) + g∗ = f∗, or determine that no such Stackelberg
routing exists.
Properties of equilibria. The following facts about Wardrop equilibria, network tolls, and Stackel-
berg routing will be useful. Recall that the delay functions are nonnegative, continuous, and strictly
increasing.
• A feasible flow f is an equilibrium flow iff ∑e(fe − ge)le(fe) ≤ 0 for every feasible flow g; see,
e.g., [23]. Thus, the total-flow vector (fe)e induced by an equilibrium flow is unique for strictly
increasing delay functions.
• Every routing game admits an acyclic Wardrop equilibrium fˆ . If the delay functions are polytime
computable, then one can solve (1) and compute: (i) fˆ in polytime for linear delay functions; (ii)
an acyclic flow f such that Φ(f) ≤ Φ(fˆ) + ǫ in time poly(input size, log(1
ǫ
)
)
. See, e.g., [23], for
details.
• Every minimal feasible flow f is enforceable via tolls [11, 17, 36], where f is minimal if there is
no other feasible flow g 6= f such that ge ≤ fe for every edge e. Given the edge delays
(
le(fe)
)
e
,
these tolls can be computed by solving an LP, and are rational provided the commodity demands
(di)i and the delays
(
le(fe)
)
e
are rational.
The following lemma was essentially shown in [16]; we include a self-contained proof in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.2. Let (G, l, (d, s, t), α) be a Stackelberg routing instance, and f∗ be a feasible flow. Then,
f(g) + g = f∗ for a Stackelberg routing g iff ge ≤ f∗e for every edge e, and ge = f∗e for all
e 6∈ S(l, f∗).
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Standard delay functions and encoding length. Our results hold for a broad class of underlying
delay functions, that we now formally describe. Throughout, we use I denote the input size of the
given routing game. We assume that we have an estimate U with logU = poly(I) such that the target
flow f∗, the parameters of the unknown true delay functions (l∗e)e, and the quantities that we seek to
compute—tolls τ∗ or the Stackelberg routing g∗ inducing f∗—all have encoding length O(logU). So
we may assume that every f∗e , τ∗e , g∗e value is a multiple of 1U , and is at most U .
When considering non-linear delay functions, we assume that the l∗es are convex polynomials of
degree at most some known constant r. Given the O(logU) encoding length, we may assume that
all coefficients lie in [0, U ] and and are multiples of 1
U
. We also assume that each dl
∗
e(x)
dx
≥ 1
U
for all
x ≥ 0. We refer to such functions as standard degree-r polynomials. Under these conditions, it is
easy to show (see Lemma 2.3) that there is some constant K := K(r) = poly(U,∑i di) such that
every delay function l∗e satisfies
(x− y)(l∗e(x)− l∗e(y)) ≤ ǫ2K =⇒ |x− y| ≤ ǫ for all x, y, ǫ ≥ 0 (2)
|l∗e(x)− l∗e(y)| ≤ K|x− y| for all x, y ∈ [0,
∑
i di] (3)
l∗e(2x) ≤ Kl∗e(x) for all x ≥ 0 (4)
These properties are referred to as inverse-K-continuity, K-Lipschitz, andK-growth-boundedness
respectively.
Lemma 2.3. Let l(x) = a0+a1x+ . . .+arxr be a convex degree-r polynomial such that a1 > 0, and
all ais lie in [0, U ] and are multiples of 1U . Then l satisfies (2)–(4) withK = max{U, 2r, rU(
∑
i di)
r−1}.
Proof. Let l′(x) := dl(x)
dx
denote the derivative of l. Since l is convex, we have |l(x) − l(y)| ≥
|x− y| · l′(min{x, y}) ≥ |x− y| · l′(0) ≥ |x− y|/U . Therefore, (x−y)2
U
≤ (x− y)(l(x)− l(y)) ≤ ǫ2
K
and so |x− y| ≤ ǫ.
Again, by convexity, |l(x)− l(y)| ≤ |x− y| · l′(max{x, y}) and l′(z) ≤ rU(∑i di)r−1 ≤ K for
all z ≤∑i di.
Finally, it is clear that l(2x) ≤ 2rl(x) ≤ Kl(x) for all x ≥ 0. 
3 Inducing target flows via tolls
Recall that here we seek to compute tolls that enforce a given target flow f∗ given black-box access
to a routing game Γ ∗ = (G, l∗, (si, ti, di)i≤k), i.e., without knowing l∗. Our main result is a crisp
positive result showing that we can always achieve this end with a polynomial number of queries by
leveraging the ellipsoid method in a novel fashion (Section 3.1). Our algorithm computes tolls that
enforce: (a) f∗ exactly, for standard linear latency functions (where it is reasonable to assume that
the black box returns the exact equilibrium); and (b) a flow that is component-wise close to f∗, for
standard polynomial functions, where we now assume that each query only returns an approximate
equilibrium (see Definition 3.3). The main idea here is to view the parameters of the latency functions
and the tolls as variables, and use the ellipsoid method to search for the tuple (l∗, τ∗), where τ∗ is
such that f(l∗, τ∗) = f∗. The key observation is that although we cannot hope to nail down l∗, given
a candidate (l, τ) such that f(l∗, τ) 6= f∗, one can derive a hyperplane separating (l, τ) from (l∗, τ∗)
using f∗ and the equilibrium flow f(l∗, τ) returned by our oracle.
We showcase the versatility of our algorithm by showing that it is easily adapted to handle various
extensions (Section 3.2). For instance, we can impose any linear constraints on tolls given by a
separation oracle; examples include the constraint that certain edges cannot be tolled or that the total
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toll paid by a user is at most a given budget. Other notable extensions include the extension to general
nonatomic congestion games, and to atomic splittable routing games under the assumption that the
equilibrium is unique.
Finally, we devise algorithms with significantly improved query complexity for multicommodity
routing games on series-parallel (sepa) networks (Section 3.3), and single-commodity routing games
on general networks (Section 3.4), both with linear latency functions. We exploit the combinato-
rial structure of sepa graphs to design an algorithm with near-linear query complexity, which almost
matches the linear lower bound shown in Theorem 5.1 for even parallel-link graphs with linear laten-
cies. For single-commodity routing games on general graphs with linear latencies, we show that flows
are linear functions of tolls and infer this linear map using O˜(m2) queries.
3.1 An ellipsoid-method based algorithm for general routing games
The ellipsoid method for finding a feasible point starts by containing the feasible region within a
ball and generates a sequence of ellipsoids of successively smaller volumes. In each iteration, one
examines the center of the current ellipsoid. If this is infeasible, then one uses a violated inequality
to obtain a hyperplane, called a separating hyperplane, to separate the current ellipsoid center from
the feasible region. One then generates a new ellipsoid by finding the minimum-volume ellipsoid
containing the half of the current ellipsoid that includes the feasible region. We utilize the following
well-known theorem about the ellipsoid method.
Theorem 3.1 ([12]). Let X ⊆ Rn be a polytope described by constraints having encoding length at
most M . Suppose that for each y ∈ Rn, we can determine if y /∈ X and if so, return a hyperplane
of encoding length at most M separating y from X. Then, we can use the ellipsoid method to find a
point x ∈ X or determine that X = ∅ in time poly(n,M).
Linear latencies. We first consider the case where each latency function l∗e(x) is a standard linear
function of the form a∗ex + b∗e, and our black box returns the exact equilibrium flow induced by the
input (rational) tolls. Thus, for every e, a∗e ∈ (0, U), b∗e ∈ [0, U ], and a∗e, b∗e are multiples of 1U . In
a somewhat atypical use of the ellipsoid method, we use the ellipsoid method to search for the point
(a∗e, b
∗
e, τ
∗
e )e. Abusing notation slightly, for a linear latency function l(x) = ax + b, we use l to also
denote the tuple (a, b).
Theorem 3.2. Given a target acyclic multicommodity flow f∗ and query access to Γ ∗, we can compute
tolls that enforce f∗ or determine that no such tolls exist, in polytime using a polynomial number of
queries.
Proof. We utilize the ellipsoid method and Theorem 3.1. Given the center (lˆ = (aˆe, bˆe)e, τˆ) of the
current ellipsoid, we first check if aˆ, bˆ, τˆ ≥ 0, and if not, use the violated constraint as the separating
hyperplane. Next, we use the black box to obtain g = f(l∗, τˆ). If g = f∗, then we are done.
Otherwise, we obtain a separating hyperplane of encoding length poly(I) as follows. (Note that the
encoding length of (lˆ, τˆ) is poly(I).) We consider two cases.
Case 1: f(lˆ, τˆ ) 6= f∗. Note that we can determine this without having to compute the equilibrium
flow f(lˆ, τˆ). Since f∗ is acyclic, we can efficiently find a commodity i, and si-ti paths P,Q such that
f∗P > 0 and lˆP (f∗) + τˆ(P ) > lˆQ(f∗) + τˆ(Q). But since f∗ = f(l∗, τ∗), we also have l∗P (f∗) +
τ∗(P ) ≤ l∗Q(f∗) + τ∗(Q). Thus, the inequality
lP (f
∗) + τ(P ) ≤ lQ(f∗) + τ(Q)
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where the parameters of l and τ are variables yields the desired separating hyperplane.
Case 2: f(lˆ, τˆ ) = f∗. Now since g 6= f∗ and is acyclic, we can again find efficiently a commodity
i and paths P,Q ∈ Pi such that gP > 0 and lˆP (g) + τˆ(P ) > lˆQ(g) + τˆ (Q). Since g = f(l∗, τˆ ), we
also have l∗P (g) + τˆ(P ) ≤ l∗Q(g) + τˆ(Q). Thus, the inequality lP (g) + τˆ(P ) ≤ lQ(g) + τˆ(Q), where
now only the les are variables, yields the desired separating hyperplane. 
Polynomial latency functions and approximate equilibria. We now consider the setting where the
latency functions (l∗e)e are standard degree-r polynomials, where r is a known constant. As before,
we also use l to denote the tuple of coefficients of the polynomial given by l. Since the Wardrop
equilibrium may now require irrational numbers, it is unreasonable to assume that a query returns the
equilibrium flow. So we assume that our black box returns an acyclic approximate equilibrium and
show that we can nevertheless compute tolls that induce an equilibrium that is component-wise close
to f∗. We first define approximate equilibria. Recall that Di(l, f) = minP∈Pi lP (f), and given tolls
τ , we define lτe (x) := le(x) + τe.
Definition 3.3. We say that a feasible flow f is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium, or simply an ǫ-
equilibrium, of a routing game (G, l, (si, ti, di)i≤k) if
∑
e fele(fe) ≤
∑
i di
(
Di(l, f) + ǫ
)
.
Notice that our approximate-equilibrium notion is implied by the more-stringent (and oft-cited)
condition requiring that if fP > 0 for P ∈ Pi then lP (f) ≤ Di(l, f) + ǫ. Importantly, our notion
turns out to be weak enough that one can argue that an acyclic ǫ-equilibrium can be computed in time
poly
(I, log(1
ǫ
)
)
for any ǫ > 0, which lends credence to our assumption that the black box returns
an acyclic ǫ-equilibrium, and yet is strong enough that one can leverage it within the framework of
the ellipsoid method (see Theorem 3.6). Unless otherwise stated, when we refer to a routing game
below, we assume that the latency functions satisfy the mild conditions (2)–(4), with logK being
polynomially bounded. The following Lemma is proved in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.4. Given a routing game with polytime-computable latency functions, one can compute an
acyclic ǫ-equilibrium in time poly
(I, log(1
ǫ
)
)
.
Lemma 3.5. Let fˆ be a Wardrop equilibrium and g be an ǫ-equilibrium of a routing game (G, l, (si, ti, di)i≤k).
Then, ‖g − fˆ‖∞ := maxe |ge − fˆe| ≤
√
Kǫ
∑
i di.
Proof. We have ∑e gele(ge) ≤∑i di(Di(l, g) + ǫ) and ∑e fˆele(ge) ≥∑i diDi(l, g). So∑e(ge −
fˆe)le(ge) ≤ ǫ
∑
i di. Also,
∑
e(fˆe−ge)le(fˆe) ≤ 0. So
∑
e(ge− fˆe)
(
le(ge)− le(fˆe)
) ≤ ǫ∑i di. Each
term of this summation is nonnegative and hence, at most ǫ
∑
i di; therefore, |ge − fˆe| ≤
√
Kǫ
∑
i di
by inverse-K-continuity. 
Define an ǫ-oracle for tolls to be an oracle that receives tolls τ ∈ RE+ as input and returns an
ǫ-equilibrium of the routing game (G, l∗τ , (si, ti, di)i≤k) having encoding length poly
(I, log(1
ǫ
)
)
.
Theorem 3.6. Let f∗ be a target acyclic multicommodity flow f∗ and δ > 0. Let ǫ = δ2
Kmk
∑
i di
.
Then, in time poly
(I, log(1
δ
)
)
and using poly
(I, log(1
δ
)
)
ǫ-oracle queries, we can compute tolls τ
such that ‖f(l∗, τ)− f∗‖∞ ≤ 2δ or determine that no such tolls exist.
Proof. As before, we use the ellipsoid method. Let (lˆ, τˆ) be the center of the current ellipsoid. Assume
that lˆ, τˆ ≥ 0 and each function lˆe has slope at least 1U ; otherwise, we can use a violated constraint as
the separating hyperplane. We use the oracle with toll-vector τˆ to obtain an acyclic ǫ-equilibrium flow
g. Then, we have ‖g − f(l∗, τˆ)‖∞ ≤
√
Kǫ
∑
i di = δ/
√
mk by Lemma 3.5.
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We can efficiently determine if f(lˆ, τˆ) 6= f∗, and if so, then as in Case 1 in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.2, we can obtain a separating hyperplane of encoding length poly
(I). So assume otherwise.
Now we check if g is anmkǫ-equilibrium for the latency functions (lˆτˆe )e. If so, then ‖g−f∗‖∞ ≤ δ
and so ‖f(l∗, τˆ ) − f∗‖∞ ≤ 2δ and we are done. Otherwise, we find a valid path-decomposition
x = (xi,P )i,P∈Pi of g having support of size at most mk. That is, we have x ≥ 0,
∑
P∈Pi xi,P = di
for every commodity i,
∑
i
∑
P∈Pi:e∈P xi,P = ge for all e, and
∑
i |{P : xi,P > 0}| ≤ mk. We may
assume that every non-zero xi,P value has encoding length that is polynomial in I and the size of g.
Then ∑
i
∑
P∈Pi
xi,P
(
lˆτˆP (g) −Di(lˆτˆ , g)
)
=
∑
e
ge lˆ
τˆ
e (ge)−
∑
i
diD
i(lˆτˆ , g) > mkǫ
∑
i
di
where the last inequality follows since g is not an mkǫ-equilibrium for (lˆτˆe )e. Since the support of x
has size at most mk, this implies that there is some commodity j and some path R ∈ Pj such that
xj,R
(
lˆτˆR(g) −Dj(lˆτˆ , g)
)
> ǫ
∑
i di. Moreover, we can find such a j and path R ∈ Pj efficiently by
simply enumerating the paths in the support of x. Let Q ∈ Pj be such that lˆτˆQ(g) = Dj(lˆτˆ , g).
Since g is an ǫ-equilibrium for the latency functions (l∗τˆe )e, again considering the path-decomposition
x, we have
∑
i
∑
P∈Pi xi,P
(
l∗τˆP (g) − Di(l∗τˆ , g)
) ≤ ǫ∑i di. Each term in this sum is nonnegative,
so each term is at most ǫ
∑
i di. In particular, we have xj,R
(
l∗τˆR (g) − l∗τˆQ (g)
) ≤ xj,R(l∗τˆR (g) −
Dj(l∗τˆ , g)
) ≤ ǫ∑i di. So the inequality xj,R(lR(g) + τˆ (R) − lQ(g) − τˆ(Q)) ≤ ǫ∑i di, with les
as the variables, is valid for (l∗, τ∗) but is violated by (lˆ, τˆ). This yields a separating hyperplane of
encoding length poly
(I, log(1
ǫ
)
)
. 
3.2 Extensions
Linear constraints on tolls given by a separation oracle. Here, we require that the tolls τ∗ impos-
ing the target flow f∗ should lie in some polyhedron X, where X is given by means of a separation
oracle. This is rich enough to model the following interesting scenarios.
• A subset F of edges cannot be tolled. This corresponds to the explicit constraint τe = 0 for all
e ∈ F .
• The total toll paid by any player under the flow f∗ is at most a given budget B. This corresponds
to the constraints τ(P ) ≤ B for every commodity i and path P ∈ Pi with f∗iP > 0. One can
separate over these exponentially-many constraints efficiently via a longest-path computation since
f∗ is acyclic.
The only change to our algorithm is that we first check if our current toll-vector τˆ lies in X. If not
then the separation oracle provided yields the separating hyperplane; otherwise, we proceed as before.
The query complexity is now polynomial in the input size and the encoding length of X.
General nonatomic congestion games. This is a generalization of network routing games, where
the graph is replaced by an arbitrary set E of resources, and Pi ⊆ 2E is the strategy-set associated
with player-type i; a more complete definition appears in Appendix B. Our ellipsoid-based algorithm
uses essentially no information about the underlying graph. We only require that given a congestion-
vector f , we can find the maximum-delay set P ∈ Pi for a given player-type i, and can find a
valid decomposition of f of small support. Both of these are trivial since the Pi sets are explicitly
given in the input. Thus, our algorithms readily extend to general nonatomic congestion games and
Theorems 3.2 and 3.6 (with mk replaced by ∑i |Pi|) continue to hold.
10
Atomic splittable routing games. Here, each commodity i represents a single player who controls
di volume of flow and her strategy is to choose an si-ti flow f i of value di. The cost incurred by a
player i under a feasible multicommodity flow (i.e., strategy profile) f = (f i)i≤k is
∑
e f
i
ele(fe).
Our results extend to atomic splittable routing games if we assume that for all valid choices of
parameters of the latency functions and tolls (as encountered during the ellipsoid method), the under-
lying atomic splittable routing game has a unique Nash equilibrium. Here, by uniqueness we mean
that if f and g are two Nash equilibria, then f ie = gie for all commodities i and edges e. This is
not without loss of generality, but is known to hold, for example, if all latency functions are convex
polynomials of degree at most 3, or if the graph is a generalized nearly-parallel graph and xle(x) is
strictly convex for all e (see [3]). When we say that tolls τ induce a flow f∗ = (f∗i)i≤k here, we
mean that the flow of every commodity i on every edge e is f∗ie in the resulting equilibrium. Our re-
sult shows that the task of computing tolls that induce specific commodity-flows can be reduced to the
task of computing Nash equilibria (under the uniqueness assumption), even in the black-box setting.
Although, to our knowledge, no algorithm is known for either of these tasks, even when latency func-
tions are given, we believe that this reduction is of independent interest. The proof of Theorem 3.7 is
very similar to that of Theorem 3.2: the only change is that to find the separating hyperplane, we now
consider the marginal delay functions instead of the delay functions; see Appendix B.
Theorem 3.7. In an atomic splittable routing game satisfying the aforementioned assumption, tolls
that induce a target flow f∗ = (f∗i)i≤k at equilibrium, if they exist, can be obtained with a polynomial
number of queries to an oracle that returns the equilibrium flow under tolls.
3.3 An algorithm for series-parallel networks with near-linear query complexity
We now give an algorithm for series-parallel networks with O˜(m) query complexity. This is a sig-
nificant improvement over the ellipsoid-based algorithm, and almost matches the linear lower bound
proved in Theorem 5.1 for single-commodity routing games on parallel-link graphs with linear latency
functions.
Theorem 3.8. On two-terminal series-parallel graphs, one can compute in polytime tolls that induce
a given target multicommodity flow f∗ using O˜(m) queries to an oracle that returns the equilibrium
flow. Thus, we obtain O˜(m) query complexity for multicommodity routing games with standard linear
delay functions.
We first recall some relevant details about series-parallel graphs. A two-terminal directed series-
parallel graph, abbreviated series-parallel (sepa) graph, with terminals s and t is defined inductively
as follows. A basic sepa graph is a directed edge (s, t). Given two sepa graphs G1 = (V1, E1)
and G2 = (V2, E2), with terminals s1, t1 and s2, t2 respectively, one can create a new sepa graph
G = (V,E) as follows. A series join of G1 and G2 yields the graph obtained by identifying t1 and
s2, with terminals s = s1 and t = t2. A parallel join of G1 and G2 yields the graph obtained by
identifying s1 and s2, and t1 and t2; its terminals are s = s1 = s2 and t = t1 = t2.
For every series-parallel graph G = (V,E), the recursive construction naturally yields a binary
decomposition tree. The leafs of the tree are edges of G, and each internal node specifies a series- or
a parallel- join. Each node of the tree also represents a subgraph of the G (obtained by performing the
joins specified by the subtree rooted at that node), which is also clearly a sepa graph. In the sequel,
we fix a decomposition tree corresponding to G. Whenever we say a subgraph of G, we mean a
subgraph corresponding to a node of this decomposition tree. Given a subgraph H , we use sH , tH to
denote its two terminals, and P(H) to denote the set of all sH -tH paths. We sometimes call sH and
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tH , the source and sink of H respectively. Let H be the collection of subgraphs corresponding to the
parallel-join nodes of the decomposition tree. For each H ∈ H obtained via the parallel join of H1
and H2, we identify one of these as the “left” subgraph HL and the other as the “right” subgraph HR.
Let P denote the set of all s-t paths, where s = sG, t = tG.
Proof outline. Before we delve into the proof of Theorem 3.8, we give some intuition and give a
roadmap of the proof. It is useful to first consider the simplest case of a graph with two parallel edges.
Observe that any target flow can be obtained by varying the difference in tolls on these two edges.
Further, the correct difference in tolls can be obtained by a binary search. Our key insight is that this
intuition can be extended to series-parallel graphs via a suitable transformation of tolls. We show that
tolls required to obtain a target flow can actually be described by the difference in tolls for each pair
of parallel subgraphs, and then use binary search to obtain the correct differences that yield the target
flow.
Formally, we show that any edge tolls in a sepa graph can in fact be transformed into certain
canonical tolls that are defined in terms of subgraphs (Claim 3.10). Further, formalizing the intuition
that what is relevant is only the difference in tolls on parallel subgraphs, we make the novel connection
that canonical tolls are in fact equivalent to labels on subgraphs H ∈ H (Lemma 3.11), where the
label on subgraph H ∈ H stores the difference in the canonical tolls of subgraphs HL and HR whose
parallel-join yields H .
Thus, our problem reduces to finding the correct labels on subgraphs H ∈ H, which we aim to
find via binary search. To do so, we establish certain structural properties of multicommodity flows in
sepa graphs (Lemma 3.13). We leverage these to argue that if the canonical edge-tolls obtained from
our current labels do not enforce the target flow, then we can find a subgraph H ∈ H and deduce
whether its label should be increased or decreased. The query complexity is thus at most |H| times
a logarithmic term depending on the accuracy required and the parameters of the routing game. A
detailed description appears after Claim 3.14.
The presence of multiple commodities complicates things, since in the particular decomposition
tree that we fix for G, all edges in a subgraph may be shortest-path edges for one commodity but not
for another. Thus creates problems with the binary search since Claim 3.14 may not hold. We handle
this by first arguing that there always exist tolls enforcing f∗ such that every s-t path, and hence every
si-ti path is a shortest-path under edge costs (l∗τ
∗
e (f
∗
e ))e (Claim 3.9).
We believe that our structural insights into tolls and multicommodity flows on sepa graphs are
of independent interest and likely to find other applications. In fact, our results on flows in sepa
graphs also play an important role in our algorithm for inducing target flows via Stackelberg routing
in Section 4.
Claim 3.9. For Γ ∗ = (G, l∗, (si, ti, di)i≤k) and target flow f∗ there exist tolls τ∗ ∈ RE+ such that:
(i) minP∈P τ∗(P ) = 0;
(ii) l∗P (f∗) + τ∗(P ) = l∗Q(f∗) + τ∗(Q) for every i and paths P,Q ∈ Pi; and therefore
(iii) f(l∗, τ∗) = f∗.
Proof. We will show that for any edge costs (ce)e, there exist tolls τ so that every s-t path is a shortest
path under edge costs (ce + τe)e, and minP∈P τ(P ) = 0. The claim follows simply by taking edge
costs (ce = l∗e(f
∗
e ))e and setting τ∗ = τ , since every si-ti path clearly belongs to some s-t path.
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The proof is by induction on the height of the decomposition tree for G. In the base case, if the
decomposition tree has height 1, G consists of a single edge and setting τe = 0 satisfies the claim. For
the inductive step, suppose G is formed by the composition of H1 and H2, and let c1 and c2 be the
edge costs in subgraphs H1 and H2 respectively. Let τ1 and τ2 be the tolls that satisfy the claim for
costs c1 in subgraph H1, and costs c2 in subgraph H2 respectively.
If G consists of H1 and H2 composed in series, let τe = τ1e if e ∈ E(H1) and τe = τ2e otherwise.
Then since any s-t path P consists of an s1-t1 path and an s2-t2 path, each of which is a shortest path
in H1 and H2 respectively, every s-t path is a shortest path. Secondly, by the inductive hypothesis,
there is a path P in H1 with τ1(P ) = 0, and a path Q in H2 with τ2(Q) = 0. The concatenation of
paths P and Q yields an s-t path R with τ(R) = 0.
Suppose G consists of H1 and H2 composed in parallel. For any paths P ∈ P(H1) and Q ∈
P(H2), let δ = c(Q) + τ2(Q) − c(P ) − τ1(P ). We may assume that δ ≥ 0 (otherwise switch H1
and H2). Note that by the inductive hypothesis the value of δ is independent of the choice of P and
Q. Define tolls τ for graph G as follows:
τvw =


τ1vw + δ, if v = s and (v,w) ∈ E(H1).
τ1vw, if v 6= s and (v,w) ∈ E(H1).
τ2vw, if (v,w) ∈ E(H2).
Then for any s-t path P , if P ∈ P(H1) then c(P ) + τ(P ) = c(P ) + τ1(P ) + δ. If Q ∈ P(H2)
then c(Q) + τ(Q) = c(Q) + τ2(Q). By definition of δ and the induction hypothesis, every s-t path
is thus a shortest s-t path. Since the tolls on paths in H2 remain the same, there is also an s-t path R
with τ(R) = 0. 
Claim 3.10. For any tolls τ ∈ RE+ on the edges of G, there exist α ∈ RE+ such that:
(i) τ(P ) = α(P ) for all P ∈ P, and
(ii) for every subgraph H and every edge e = (sH , v) ∈ E(H), αe ≥ minP∈P(H) α(P ).
Proof. The proof is again by induction on the height of the decomposition tree. If G is a single edge,
then α = τ . If G is composed of subgraphs H1 and H2, let τ1 and τ2 be the projection of τ onto the
subgraphs. If H1 and H2 are in parallel, and tolls α1 and α2 satisfy the claim for tolls τ1 and τ2 in
the subgraphs, it is easy to verify that tolls α defined by αe = α1e for e ∈ E(H1) and αe = α2e for
e ∈ E(H2) satisfy the claim.
If H1 and H2 are in series, let α1 and α2 satisfy the claim for tolls τ1 and τ2 in the subgraphs.
Define δ = minP∈P(H2) α2(P ) and define the tolls
αvw =


α1vw + δ, if v = s1 and (v,w) ∈ E(H1)
α1vw, if v 6= s1 and (v,w) ∈ E(H1)
α2vw − δ, if v = s2 and (v,w) ∈ E(H2)
α2vw, if v 6= s2 and (v,w) ∈ E(H2).
Any s-t path P consists of segment P1 between vertices s = s1 and t1, and segment P2 between
t1 = s2 and t = t2. Then
α(P ) = α(P1) + α(P2) = α
1(P1) + δ + α
2(P2)− δ = τ1(P1) + τ2(P2) = τ(P ) .
Thus the first part of the claim is satisfied.
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For the second part, consider any subgraph H . If H = G, then since every path P ∈ P(H)
consists of segments P1 ∈ P(H1) and P2 ∈ P(H2), for every edge e = (s, v) ∈ E,
αsv = α
1
sv + δ
≥ min
P∈P(H1)
α1(P ) + min
P∈P(H2)
α2(P ) (by the inductive hypothesis and definition of δ)
= min
P∈P(H1)
α1(P ) + δ + min
P∈P(H2)
α2(P )− δ
= min
P∈P(H)
α(P ) .
If H 6= G, then since every path path P ∈ P(H) contains exactly one edge incident to sH , the toll
along every path changes by exactly the same quantity (+δ, −δ, or zero). 
We call tolls α ∈ RE+ that satisfy property (ii) of Claim 3.10 canonical tolls. Thus, any edge tolls
can be modified to obtain canonical edge tolls α. These in turn can be mapped to a labeling (L,∆),
where ∆ = (∆H)H∈H ∈ RH+ , by setting L = minP∈P α(P ), and ∆H = minP∈P(HL) α(P ) −
minP∈P(HR) α(P ) for all H ∈ H. Lemma 3.11 shows that this mapping is in fact invertible. Given
the labeling (L,∆) we can obtain canonical edge tolls α by the following procedure. Note that
|H| ≤ m.
M1. Initialize αe = 0 for all e.
M2. We traverse subgraphs in H in a bottom-up manner, i.e., we consider all subgraphs in H that are descen-
dants ofH ∈ H before consideringH . When we consider a subgraphH , we set αe = αe+max{0,∆H}
for all e = (sH , v) ∈ E(HL), and αe = αe +max{0,−∆H} for all e = (sH , v) ∈ E(HR).
M3. Finally, we set αe = αe + L for all e = (s, v) ∈ E.
Lemma 3.11. Let (L,∆) be the labeling obtained from some canonical tolls α ∈ RE+, and β be the
tolls obtained from (L,∆) by the above procedure. Then α = β.
Proof. Let β′ be the tolls obtained after step 1 of the above procedure, i.e., before adding L to the
edges incident to s. We will show that for each edge e not incident to s, β′e = αe, while for each edge
e incident to s, β′e = αe −minP∈P α(P ).
The proof is by induction on the size of G. If G = {e}, then since there are no parallel composi-
tions, H = ∅, and hence β′e = 0 = αe − minP∈P α(P ). If G is the series-join of H1 and H2, then
for each edge not incident to sH1 or sH2 , β′e = αe by the inductive hypothesis. Further, note that the
minimum toll α(P ) over all sH2-tH2 paths must be zero, since otherwise, on any edge e = (s, v),
αe would be strictly less than the minimum toll over s-t paths. Hence by the inductive hypothesis
β′e = αe for edges that leave sH2 . For edges incident to s, since any s-t path consists of a path
between s and t1 = s2 and between s2 and t, and by the inductive hypothesis,
β′e = αe − min
P∈P(H1)
α(P ) = αe −min
P∈P
α(P )
where the second equality follows because, as earlier observed, the minimum toll α(P ) over all sH2-
tH2 paths must be zero. Thus the inductive hypothesis holds in this case.
If G is the parallel-join of H1 and H2, then for each edge not incident to s, β′e = αe by the induc-
tive hypothesis. Further, assume without loss of generality that minP∈P(H1) α(P ) = minP∈P α(P ).
Then by the inductive hypothesis, for each edge e = (s, v) ∈ E(H1),
β′e = αe − min
P∈P(H1)
α(P ) = αe −min
P∈P
α(P )
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as stated in the claim. Let δ = minP∈P(H2) α(P ) − minP∈P(H1) α(P ) ≥ 0. By the procedure for
computing β′, if H1 = HL and H2 = HR, then ∆H = −δ, otherwise ∆H = δ. In both cases, when
considering G, we only modify the tolls on edges of E(H2) incident to sH2 by adding δ to these. So
for each edge e = (s, v) ∈ E(H2), we have
β′e = αe − min
P∈P(H2)
α(P ) + δ
= αe − min
P∈P(H2)
α(P ) + min
P∈P(H2)
α(P )− min
P∈P(H1)
α(P )
= αe − min
P∈P
α(P )
which completes the induction step, and hence, the proof. 
Definition 3.12. Given multicommodity flows f and f˜ , we call a pair H1, H2 of subgraphs, (f, f˜)-
discriminating if:
(i) the parallel-join of H1 and H2 is a subgraph in H; and
(ii) fe > f˜e for all e ∈ E(H1), and fe ≤ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H2).
Lemma 3.13. Let f and f˜ be two feasible multicommodity flows for (G, (si, ti, di)i≤k). If f 6= f˜ ,
then there exists an (f, f˜)-discriminating pair of subgraphs.
Proof Sketch. We use induction on the series-parallel structure to first show a slightly weaker state-
ment: there exist subgraphs H1 and H2 whose parallel join is in H such that: (a) fe ≥ f˜e for all
e ∈ E(H1), fe ≤ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H2), and (b) |fH1 |, which we define to be the total flow routed
under f in H1 for commodities not internal to H1, is greater than |f˜H1 |, and |fH2 | < |f˜H2 |. Now
if fe > f˜e for all e ∈ E(H1) then we are done. Otherwise, we show that if we consider the mini-
mal subgraph K of H1 (under the same decomposition tree used for G) that contains both fe > f˜e
and fe = f˜e edges, then K must be a parallel-join of subgraphs that form an (f, f˜)-discriminating
pair. 
We defer a full proof of Lemma 3.13 until Appendix C.
Claim 3.14. Let fˆ = f(l∗, τ). If there is a subgraph H such that fˆe > f∗e for all e ∈ E(H) then
there is some commodity i such that every sH -tH path is part of a shortest si-ti path under edge costs
(l∗τe (fˆe))e.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of H . If H is an edge e, there is some commodity i
such that fˆ ie > 0, so the statement holds. If H is the parallel join of H1,H2, then it follows from
the induction hypothesis that every sH -tH path must be of equal length (since there are commodities
corresponding to both H1 and H2); hence, there is a commodity corresponding to H and the statement
follows. Suppose H is the series composition of H1,H2. Let K be the set of commodities i such that∑
e=(sH ,v)∈E(H)
fˆ ie > 0. For every i ∈ K such that ti ∈ V (H) \ {tH}, the set of edges (sH , v) ∈
E(H) forms an si-ti cut, and so the flow across the cut must be the same in fˆ i and f∗i. However,∑
e=(sH ,v)∈E(H)
fˆe >
∑
e=(sH ,v)∈E(H)
f∗e , so there is some commodity j ∈ K such that sj, tj /∈
V (H)\{sH , tH}. For commodity j, some sH -tH path is part of a shortest sj-tj path under edge costs
(l∗τe (fˆe))e. Applying the induction hypothesis to H1,H2 yields that all sH -tH paths are of the same
length. Thus, every sH -tH path is part of a shortest sj-tj paths under edge costs (l∗τe (fˆe))e. 
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We now describe the algorithm for Theorem 3.8. Let τ∗ be tolls given by part (b) of Claim 3.9
and (0,∆∗) be the labeling obtained from τ∗. We may assume that τ∗e ∈ [0, U ′] and is a multiple
of 1
U ′
for all e, where U ′ = m poly(U,
∑
i di). E.g., with standard linear latencies, since every
f∗e , a
∗
e, b
∗
e ∈ [0, U ] and is a multiple of 1U , we can take U ′ = max{U2,mK
∑
i di}.
T1. Initialize, LH = −mU ′, UH = mU ′, ∆H = 0 for all H ∈ H. Let L = 0. Let M = m log(8mU ′2).
T2. For r = 1, . . . ,M , we do the following. Map (L,∆) to canonical tolls α as described in steps M1–M3.
Query the oracle to obtain fˆ = f(l∗, α). If fˆ = f∗, then exit the loop. Otherwise, find an (fˆ , f∗)-
discriminating pair of subgraphs H1, H2 (which exists by Lemma 3.13).
Let H be the parallel join of H1, H2. If H1 = HL, update LH ← ∆H , else update UH ← ∆H . If
|UH − LH | < 1U ′ , set ∆H to be the multiple of 1U ′ in [LH , UH ]; else update ∆H = (LH + UH)/2.
T3. Return tolls α.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. Let α∗ be the canonical tolls obtained from τ∗ via Claim 3.10, and let (L∗,∆∗)
be the corresponding labeling. We have L∗ = 0 due to Claims 3.9 and 3.10. The proof of Claim 3.10
shows that, under the assumptions on τ∗, we have α∗e is a multiple of 1U ′ , and is in [0,mU
′] for all e.
Hence, ∆∗H ∈ [−mU ′,mU ′] and is a multiple of 1U ′ , for all H ∈ H.
We say that the intervals [LH , UH ] assigned to H ∈ H are valid if ∆∗H ∈ [LH , UH ] for all H ∈ H.
We argue below that our algorithm maintains valid intervals. Give this, in each iteration we halve the
length of some interval, and this may happen at most log(8mU ′2) times for the interval of some
H ∈ H until we find ∆∗H , since ∆∗H is a multiple of 1U ′ . Since there are at most m subgraphs in H,
after M iterations (without reaching f∗), we obtain ∆∗.
We now prove that the algorithm maintains valid intervals. Given tolls τ and a subgraph H ,
define τH := minP∈P(H) τ(P ). So ∆∗H = α∗HL − α∗HR . The intervals are clearly valid at the start
of the algorithm. Suppose the intervals are valid at the start of an iteration in step T2. We may
assume that fˆ 6= f∗. By Claim 3.14, there is some commodity i such that every sH1-tH1 path is
part of a shortest si-ti path under edge costs (l∗e(fˆe) + αe)e. Let P = argminP ′∈P(H1) α
∗(P ′) and
Q = argminQ′∈P(H2) α(Q). Since P is a segment of a shortest-path for commodity i, We have
l∗P (f
∗) + αH1 < l
∗
P (fˆ) + αH1 ≤ l∗P (fˆ) + α(P ) ≤ l∗Q(fˆ) + α(Q) = l∗Q(fˆ) + αH2 ≤ l∗Q(f∗) + αH2 .
Here, the first and last inequalities follow since H1,H2 is (fˆ , f∗)-discriminating. The second inequal-
ity follows from the definition of αH1 ; the third, since P is part of a shortest si-ti path; and the fourth
equality, from the definition of Q. We know that every s-t path is a shortest s-t path under edge costs
(l∗e(f
∗
e ) + α
∗
e)e. So we have
l∗P (f
∗) + α∗H1 = l
∗
P (f
∗) + α∗(P ) = l∗Q(f
∗) + α∗(Q) ≥ l∗Q(f∗) + α∗H2 .
Combining this with the earlier inequality gives αH1 − αH2 < α∗H1 − α∗H2 . So if H1 = HL, then
∆H < ∆
∗
H ; otherwise, ∆H > ∆∗H . Thus, our update for H preserves the validity of the intervals. 
Remark 3.15. Our analysis shows that the above algorithm works whenever we have a “sign oracle”
that given input tolls τ and a flow f∗, returns the sign of f(l∗, τ)e − f∗e for all edges e. This is clearly
weaker than having an exact-equilibrium oracle.
3.4 Nearly quadratic query complexity for single-commodity, linear-delay routing games
Theorem 3.16. For a single-commodity routing game Γ with standard linear delay functions, tolls
that enforce f∗ can be obtained in at most O˜(m2) queries.
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Throughout, we assume without loss of generality that f∗ > 0; otherwise, we impose infinite
tolls on any edge where f∗e = 0, effectively removing these edges from the graph.1 We assume
the delay function on any edge e is le(x) = aex + be. Define lmax(x) := maxe∈E aex + be, and
κ(x) = x2/Kd. Define the support of a flow f to be the set of edges with strictly positive flow. We
will use negative tolls in our proof; however, by Claim 3.17 which we prove in Appendix D, this is
again just a notational convenience. Similar arguments were used in [10] to show boundedness of
tolls, but the results are not directly applicable. Note that f∗ is acyclic.
Claim 3.17. For a single-commodity routing game and tolls τ , there exist tolls τ ′ ≥ 0 so that f(τ) =
f(τ ′) and τ ′e′ ≤ τe′ +
∑
e:τe<0
|τe| for all e′. If the graph is acyclic, τ ′ can be obtained without
knowledge of the delay functions.
Proof outline. We show that if the support of the equilibrium flow remains fixed, the equilibrium
flow is a linear function of the tolls. Thus if we can obtain tolls τ so that the support of f(τ) is the
same as f∗, we can solve a linear system of equations to obtain tolls that enforce f∗. Accordingly, our
algorithm consists of the following two steps.
Step 1: Enforcing the correct support. We first obtain tolls τ so that fe(τ) > 0 ⇔ f∗e > 0. By
suitably large tolls on edges e for which f∗e = 0, we already have tolls that satisfy one direction of
the implication. The other direction is roughly by binary search, described in Lemma 3.20: we pick
an edge r that does not yet have flow, and impose increasingly negative tolls on this edge until it has
positive flow at the equilibrium. The difficulty here is in maintaining monotonicity of the support
of the equilibrium flow. Increasing the flow on edge r decreases flow on the other edges. We use
a number of results regarding the sensitivity of equilibrium flow for this step. In fact, this step has
quadratic query complexity, while the second step that actually obtains tolls that enforce f∗ has linear
query complexity.
Step 2: Obtaining the target flow f∗. We now use Lemma 3.22 which establishes the linearity
of equilibrium flow as a function of tolls, if the support of the equilibrium flow does not change.
Obtaining the coefficients of this linear map requires us to query the oracle with a small toll on each
edge. The query complexity of this step is thus linear.
We start with some results about the continuity, monotonicity, and sensitivity of equilibrium flow
as a function of tolls. Theorem 3.18(ii) was earlier proved in [8]. Let 1e ∈ RE be the vector with
value 1 in coordinate e, and 0 everywhere else.
Theorem 3.18. Let Γ be a single-commodity routing game with standard linear delay functions.
Then,
(i) ‖f(0)− f(1eκ(ǫ))‖∞ ≤ ǫ,
(ii) f(τ) is continuous,
(iii) for edge r and δ > 0, fr(1rδ) ≤ fr(0), and
(iv) for edge r and δ > 0, |fr(−1rδ)− fr(0)| ≥ ‖f(−1rδ) − f(0)‖∞.
The proof of (i) and (ii) are straightforward from the following immediate Corollary of Lemma 3.5.
We prove (iii) and (iv) in Appendix D.
1The use of infinite tolls is a notational convenience; the same effect can be obtained with tolls m22mlmax(d).
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Corollary 3.19. For a multicommodity routing game Γ , let fˆ be the equilibrium flow. If g is a
valid multicommodity flow that satisfies for all i, P ∈ Pi, gP > 0 ⇒ lP (g) ≤ Di(l, g) + ǫ, then
‖g − fˆ‖∞ ≤
√
Kǫ
∑
i di.
We now show a lemma that is used to prove the first step of our proof. Lemma 3.20 shows that
if edge r has no flow or very little flow at equilibrium, then with a small number of queries we can
obtain tolls so that the flow on edge r increases, and the flow on the other edges does not change
significantly.
Lemma 3.20. Let Γ be a single-commodity nonatomic routing game, and let δ > 0, δ ≤ d. For tolls
τ , let S := {e : fe(τ) ≥ δ}, and edge r 6∈ S. Then with log (−N/κ(δ/3)) queries, we can determine
tolls τ ′ so that fe(τ ′) ≥ δ/3 for all e ∈ S ∩ {r}, where N := minP∈P τP − minP∈P:r∈P τP −
mlmax(d) < 0 .
Proof. To obtain tolls τ ′, we will only vary the tolls on edge r. We thus parametrize tolls τ ′ by α,
where τ ′ = τ + 1rα.
If fr(τ) ≥ δ/3, we are done. Otherwise, we claim that if α = N , then fr(τ ′) = d. To see this, let
Q be the path that minimizes
∑
e∈P aed+ be + τe over all paths P ∈ P with r ∈ P , and let f be the
flow that sends the entire demand along this path. Then the delay along this path with tolls τ ′ is
∑
e∈Q
(
aed+ be + τ
′
e
)
=
∑
e∈Q
(aed+ be + τe) +N
= min
P :r∈P
∑
e∈P
(aed+ be + τe) + min
P∈P
τ(P )− min
P∈P:r∈P
τ(P )−mlmax(d)
≤ min
P∈P
τ(P ) ,
while for any path P with r 6∈ P , the delay along path P is at least this quantity. Hence f is actually
an equilibrium flow, and if α ≤ N , then fr(τ ′) = d.
Define a, b ∈ [N, 0] as follows.
a := max{α ∈ [N, 0] : fr(τ ′) = δ/3}
b := min{α ∈ [N, 0] : fr(τ ′) = 2δ/3}
By the continuity of equilibrium flow with respect to tolls (Theorem 3.18, (ii)), a, b exist. By the
monotonicity of equilibrium flow, for any α ∈ [b, a], fr(τ ′) ∈ [δ/3, 2δ/3]. Then by Theorem 3.18,
(iv), for any edge e ∈ S and α ∈ [b, a], fe(τ ′) ∈ [δ/3, δ]. Thus our problem reduces to finding an
α ∈ [b, a], which we can find by binary search. We will show that a − b ≥ κ(δ/3), which gives
us the bound on the number of queries required. To see this, let τa and τ b be the tolls obtained
by setting α = a and α = b respectively. Then if a − b ≤ κ(δ/3), then by Theorem 3.18 (i),
‖f(τa)− f(τ b)‖ ≤ δ/3. 
F1. Initialize τe ← 0 for all e, i← 1, and S ← {e : fe(τ) ≤ d/3i}.
F2. While S 6= E
F3. Pick an edge r 6∈ S
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F4. By Lemma 3.20, find α ∈ [N, 0] so that if τ ′ = τ + 1rα, then fe(τ ′) ≥ d/3i+1 for all e ∈ S ∪ {r}.
F5. τ ← τ ′, i← i+ 1, S ← {e : fe(τ) ≤ d/3i}
Lemma 3.21. The stated algorithm terminates with tolls τ so that fe(τ) ≥ d/3m on every edge, and
requires O(m2 log(3mlmax(d)) queries.
Proof of Lemma 3.21. Let N(i) be the value of N in the ith iteration of the while loop. Then by
Lemma 3.20, the ith iteration requires log(−N(i)/κ(d/3i+1)) queries to complete, and adds at least
one edge to the set S. Thus, there are at most m iterations of the while loop. We will show that
|N(i)| ≤ m2i−1lmax(d), thus proving the bound on the number of queries. Note that since all tolls
are negative, |minP τP −minP :r∈P τP | ≤ |minP τP |.
The proof is by induction. In the first iteration since τ = 0 initially, N(1) ≤ mlmax(d). In the
ith iteration, there are at most i − 1 other edges with tolls on them, and along any path the sum of
the absolute values of these tolls is at most
∑
j≤i−1 2
j−1mlmax(d) = (2
i−1− 1)mlmax(d), and hence
|N(i)| ≤ 2i−1mlmax(d). 
This completes the first step of our proof. We now proceed with the second step. Lemma 3.22
shows that the equilibrium flow is a linear function of the tolls, as long as the set of edges with strictly
positive flow remains constant. While a similar result on the linearity of the equilibrium flow was
shown in [7], Lemma 3.22 shows how to obtain the coefficients of the linear map.
Lemma 3.22. For any routing game Γ and tolls τ (1), let f(τ (1)) > 0. Then there exist coefficients
(βe,e′)e,e′∈E so that for any tolls τ ,
(i) f(τ + τ (1)) > 0⇒ f(τ + τ (1)) = f(τ (1)) + βτ , and
(ii) f(τ (1)) + βτ > 0⇒ f(τ + τ (1)) = f(τ (1)) + βτ .
Proof. We first show how to obtain the coefficients (βe,e′)e,e′ . Define fmin = mine f(0) > 0. For
each edge e′, let αe′ := 1e′κ(fmin/2). By Corollary 3.19, f(τ (1) + αe
′
) > fmin/2 for each edge e′.
Then for each edge e ∈ E, define βe,e′ =
(
fe(τ
(1) + αe
′
)− fe(τ (1))
)
/κ(fmin/2).
Given tolls τ , let g := f(τ (1)) +
∑
e′ βe,e′τe′ . In general, g may be negative on some edges.
However, we show that g is an s-t pseudoflow of value d: it satisfies all the conditions for being a
flow except nonnegativity. Further, we show that g is a minimizer of (1) if we allow each f to be a
pseudoflow, rather than a flow.
To see the first claim, note that for a fixed edge e′ since βe,e′ is the difference of two (scaled) flows
of the same value, it is a circulation. Then g is the sum of a flow and a set of circulations, and is hence
a pseudoflow.
To show that g equalizes the delay on every s-t path with tolls τ , for any s-t path p,
∑
e∈p
le(g) − le(f(τ1)) =
∑
e∈p
ae
(
ge − fe(τ1)
)
=
∑
e∈p
ae
∑
e′
βe,e′τe′
=
∑
e′
τe′
κ(fmin/2)
∑
e∈p
ae
(
fe(τ
(1) + αe
′
)− fe(τ (1))
)
(5)
Since f(τ (1) + αe′) and f(τ (1)) are equilibrium flows with tolls τ (1) + αe′ and τ (1) respectively, and
both are strictly positive on every edge, it follows from (5) that
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∑
e∈p
le(g) − le(f(τ (1))) =
∑
e′
τe′
κ(fmin/2)
(
D(f(τ (1) + αe
′
))−D(f(τ (1)))−
∑
e∈p
αe
′
e
)
and since αe′e = 0 for e 6= e′,
∑
e∈p
le(g)− le(f(τ (1))) =
∑
e′
τe′
κ(fmin/2)
(
D(f(τ (1) + αe
′
))−D(f(τ (1)))
)
−
∑
e∈p
τe .
Thus for any path p,
∑
e∈p
le(g) + τe =
∑
e∈p
le(f(τ
(1))) +
∑
e′
τe′
κ(fmin/2)
(
D(f(τ (1) + αe
′
))−D(f(τ (1)))
)
.
Further, for any path p,
∑
e∈p le(f(τ
(1))) = D(f(τ (1)−∑e∈p τ (1)e . Hence for any path p,∑e∈p le(g)+
τe + τ
(1)
e is equal. It follows immediately that if the second condition in the lemma is true, i.e., if
g > 0, then g must be an equilibrium flow with tolls τ (1) + τ , and since the equilibrium is unique,
f(τ + τ (1)) = g. This completes the proof of the second statement.
For the first statement, for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 define h(λ) = f(τ (1) + τ) + λ(g − f(τ (1) + τ)). Since on
any path p as shown earlier
∑
e∈p le(g) + τe + τ
(1)
e is equal, and f(τ (1) + τ) > 0 by assumption, this
is also true for h(λ). Further since f(τ (1) + τ) > 0, there exists λ > 0 so that h(λ) > 0. Then h(λ)
must also be an equilibrium flow with tolls τ . By the uniqueness of equilibria, this is only possible if
f(τ + τ (1)) = g. 
L1. Use the earlier algorithm to get tolls τ (1) so that f(τ (1)) ≥ d/2m.
L2. Obtain the coefficients (βe,e′)e,e′ as in Lemma 3.22
L3. Solve the linear equations βτ (2) = f∗ − f(τ (1)) for tolls τ (2). Then f(τ (2) + τ (1)) = f∗.
Proof of Theorem 3.16. We will show that the algorithm is correct, and requires O(m2 log(3mlmax(d))
queries. The correctness of the first step follows from Lemma 3.21. To use Lemma 3.22, since
fmin ≥ d/2m, to obtain the coefficients (βe,e′)e,e′, we require an additional m queries, each of which
applies an additional toll (relative to τ (1)) of κ(d/2m+1) on individual edges.
Let τ∗ be tolls such that f(τ∗) = f∗. By the first part of Lemma 3.22, then f∗ = f(τ (1)) +
β(τ∗ − τ (1)). Now τ (2) is a solution to the system of linear equalities βτ (2) = f∗ − f(τ (1)); since
τ∗ − τ (1) satisfies this, we know a solution exists. Further, by the second part of the Lemma since
f(τ (1)) + βτ (2) = f∗ > 0, in fact f(τ (1) + τ (2)) = f∗. Hence τ (1) + τ (2) are the tolls required to
obtain the target flow. 
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4 Inducing target flows via Stackelberg routing on series-parallel graphs
Recall that here we have a single-commodity routing game Γ ∗ = (G, l∗, (s, t, d)). We are given a
parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and a target flow f∗, and we seek an s-t flow g of value of at most αd such
that g + f(l∗, g) = f∗, if one exists. We abbreviate f(l∗, g) to f(g). We consider the setting where
G is a directed sepa graph with terminals s and t, and devise an efficient algorithm that computes a
Stackelberg routing inducing f∗ using at most m queries to an oracle that returns the equilibrium flow.
The flow g we compute is in fact of minimum value among all Stackelberg flows that induce f∗. (So
either g is the desired Stackelberg flow, or none exists if |g| > αd.) Our algorithm works for arbitrary
increasing delay functions provided, as in Section 3.3, we have an oracle that returns the correct sign
of ((f(g)+g
)
e
−f∗)e given a Stackelberg routing g. In particular, the algorithm works for increasing
linear latencies.
As before, we fix a decomposition tree for G, and a subgraph refers to a subgraph corresponding
to a node of this tree. For a flow f and subgraph H , let fH denote (fe)e∈E(H). We again leverage the
concept of a good pair of subgraphs, which becomes much simpler to state in the single-commodity
setting.
Definition 4.1 (specialization of Definition C.1). Given s-t flows f , f˜ , we call a pair of subgraphs
H1, H2 (f, f˜)-good if:
(i) the parallel-join of H1, H2 is a subgraph;
(ii) fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H1) and fe ≤ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H2); and
(iii) |fH1 | > |f˜H1 | and |fH2 | < |f˜H2 |.
Lemma 4.2. Let g be any Stackelberg routing. If f(g) + g 6= f∗, there exists an (f(g) + g, f∗)-good
pair of subgraphs.
Lemma 4.2 follows from a more general result proved in Lemma C.2 for multicommodity flows.
The proof in the single-commodity setting becomes much simpler, and follows immediately from
Claim 4.3 since |f(g) + g| = |f∗|.
Claim 4.3. For any two s-t flows f , f˜ in a sepa graph G, either there is an (f, f˜)-good pair of
subgraphs, or one of the following holds:
(i) If |f | = |f˜ | then f = f˜ .
(ii) If |f | > |f˜ | then f ≥ f˜ .
(iii) If |f | < |f˜ | then f ≤ f˜ .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the size of the graph. For a single edge, there is no good pair of
subgraphs, but one of the three cases must hold. For the induction step, let G be the join of subgraphs
G1 and G2. Let f1 = fG1 , f˜1 = f˜G1 , and f2 = fG2 , f˜2 = f˜G2 . Clearly, f1, f˜1 are sG1-tG1 flows, and
f2, f˜2 are sG2-tG2 flows. If G1 contains an (f1, f˜1)-good pair, or G2 contains an (f2, f˜2)-good pair,
then the same pair is an (f, f˜)-good pair, and we are done. So assume otherwise.
Suppose G1 and G2 are in series. Then, |f1| = |f | = |f2|, and |f˜1| = |f˜ | = |f˜2|. So whichever
case applies to f and f˜ , the same applies to f1, f˜1, and f2, f˜2. By the induction hypothesis, we have
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the desired relationship between f1, f˜1 and f2, f˜2, and hence between f and f˜ . So the statement holds
for G.
Suppose G1 and G2 are in parallel. If |f1| > |f˜1| and |f2| < |f˜2|, then by the induction hypothesis,
f1 ≥ f˜1, f2 ≤ f˜2, so G1, G2 is an (f, f˜)-good pair. Similarly, if |f1| < |f˜1| and |f2| > |f˜2|, then G2,
G1 is an (f, f˜)-good pair. So assume neither case holds.
Now if |f | = |f˜ |, then (after eliminating the above cases) |f1| = |f˜1|, |f2| = |f˜2|. Hence, by the
induction hypothesis, we have f1 = f˜1, f2 = f˜2, and so f = f˜ .
If |f | > |f˜ |, then it must be that |f1| ≥ |f˜1| and |f2| ≥ |f˜2|. Therefore, f1 ≥ f˜1, f2 ≥ f˜2, and so
f ≥ f˜ .
Finally, if |f | < |f˜ |, then it must be that |f1| ≤ |f˜1|, |f2| ≤ |f˜2|. Hence, f1 ≤ f˜1, f2 ≤ f˜2, and so
f ≤ f˜ . This completes the induction step, and hence, the proof. 
Our algorithm is now quite simple to describe. We keep track of the set S¯, initialized to ∅, of
edges not on any shortest s-t path under the edge costs (l∗e(f∗e ))e. By Lemma 2.2, S¯ must be saturated
by any Stackelberg routing that induces f∗. We repeatedly do the following.
S1. Find the flow g of minimum value that saturates every edge in S¯ and satisfies ge ≤ f∗e for all e.
S2. Query the oracle with g as the Stackelberg flow. If f∗ = f(g) + g, exit and return g. Otherwise, find an
(f(g) + g, f∗)-good pair of subgraphs H1, H2. Add every edge in H2 to S¯ (and repeat the process).
Theorem 4.4. The above algorithm computes a Stackelberg flow g of minimum value that induces f∗
in at most m queries.
Proof. In every iteration, |S¯| increases by at least 1: since |fH2(g) + gH2 | < |f∗H2 | and g saturates
every edge in S¯, we know that at least one edge in H2 is not in the current set S¯. When S¯ = E, we
have g = f∗. So the algorithm terminates in at most m iterations with some flow g that induces f∗.
To complete the proof, we only need to show that any edge added to S¯ is indeed a non-shortest-path
edge. Let h = f(g) + g. Let s′ = sH1 = sH2 , t′ = tH1 = tH2 . Since |hH1 | > |f∗H1 |, there is some
s′-t′ path P in H1 such that (h − f∗)P > 0. So P belongs to a shortest s-t path under edge costs
(l∗e(he))e. So for every s′-t′ path Q in H2, we have l∗P (f∗) < l∗P (h) ≤ l∗Q(h) ≤ l∗Q(f∗). So every
edge of H2 is a non-shortest-path edge under edge costs (l∗e(f∗e ))e. 
5 Query- and computational- complexity lower bounds
5.1 A linear lower bound for query complexity with tolls
We show a lower bound of Ω(m) on the number of queries required to obtain tolls that give the target
flow.
Theorem 5.1. Any deterministic algorithm that computes tolls required to enforce a target flow re-
quires Ω(m) queries, even for a single commodity instance on parallel links with linear delay func-
tions.
Our example for the lower bound consists of a single commodity on m parallel links, with the
demand d = m and the target flow f∗e = 1 on each edge. In fact, our lower bound is actually for the
problem of obtaining tolls τ with the right support: fe(τ) > 0 iff f∗e > 0.
For our lower bound example, our delay functions are defined by a permutation π∗ : [m] → [m].
The delay function on the parallel edge ei is be given by (x/m) + 2(π∗(i) − 1). Thus, we use the
notation f(π, τ) for the equilibrium flow, where the permutation π identifies the delay functions.
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We show that any algorithm that computes the correct tolls to enforce f∗ must obtain the correct
permutation π∗, and we design an oracle that after k queries has only revealed information about
π∗−1(1), · · · , π∗−1(k). Thus, in order to compute the correct tolls, any algorithm requires m − 1
queries.
Our oracle works as follows. Initially, let A0 = ∅ be the set of assigned edges in the partial
permutation π∗. For the jth query τ j = (τ je )e∈E , our oracle returns the equilibrium flow described
below.
Oracle: Pick an arbitrary edge e that with minimum toll τ je , so that e is not in Aj−1. Let π∗(e) = j
and Aj = Aj−1 ∪ {e}. Let π(j) be a complete permutation that extends the partial permutation π∗,
and return f(π(j), τ j) as the equilibrium flow in response to tolls τ j .
Claim 5.2. For j ∈ [m], let σ be any permutation that satisfies σ(e) = π(j)(e) for all edges e ∈ Aj .
Then for any edge e 6∈ Aj , fe(σ, τ j) = 0
Proof. By description of the oracle and since e 6∈ Aj , e is not the unique edge with minimum toll in
τj . That is, there exists an edge h ∈ Aj with τ jh ≤ τ je . Since h ∈ Aj , σ(h) ≤ j < σ(e). Further since
τ jh ≤ τ je , by description of the delay functions, le(0) > lh(d), and hence edge e cannot have flow at
equilibrium. 
We now show that the equilibrium flows returned by our oracle are consistent.
Lemma 5.3. There exists a permutation σ so that for every j ∈ [m], f(π(j), τ j) = f(σ, τ j).
Proof. Fix j ≤ m, and let σ be a complete permutation that extends π∗. The image of every edge
e ∈ Aj is the same in π∗ and π(j). Thus the delay functions on both edges is the same. By Claim 5.2,
the equilibrium is zero for any edge not in Aj . Since edges in Aj have the same delay function, the
equilibrium flow must be the same for permutations σ and π(j). 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. From Lemma 5.3, for any sequence of m − 1 toll queries, the oracle returns
a consistent sequence of equilibrium responses. Further, from Claim 5.2, since |Aj| ≤ m − 1 for
j ≤ m− 1, there is an edge e with no flow in the equilibrium returned by the oracle. Hence, since f∗
has positive flow on every edge, any deterministic algorithm requires at least m queries to compute
tolls that obtain f∗. 
5.2 Lower bounds for determining equivalence with Stackelberg routing
Given the ability to query a routing game and obtain the equilibrium flow, a natural question is if
we can in fact obtain the delay functions on the edges. It is obvious that the exact delay functions
cannot be obtained, even for a single edge. However, is it possible to obtain delay functions that are
equivalent, in the sense that any Stackelberg routing would yield almost the same equilibrium flow as
in the routing game?
Definition 5.4. Given a graph G with demand d between s and t and a Stackelberg demand fraction
α, two sets of delay functions on the edges l1 and l2 are ǫ-equivalent if for every Stackelberg routing
g with |g| ≤ αd, ‖f(l1, g)− f(l2, g)‖∞ ≤ ǫ.
We prove strong lower bounds for this problem, both for the query complexity and the computa-
tional complexity. In fact, for the query complexity, the lower bound instance is a graph of constant
size. The size of the input is determined by the demand d, and we show that although the size of the
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input is O(log d) any deterministic algorithm that determines ǫ-equivalence for a fixed ǫ must make
Ω(
√
d) queries. For computational hardness, we show that even if we are explicitly given affine delay
functions l1 and l2, determining 1/2-equivalence is NP-hard. Our proof for computational hardness
builds upon a reduction given by Roughgarden [27].
Query complexity. We are now given a graph G with demand d between s and t, a Stackelberg
demand fraction α, and a set of delay functions l1 on the edges of G. In addition, we are given query
access to a second set of delay functions l2. As before, each query consists of a Stackelberg routing
g, and the response is the equilibrium flow f(l2, g). We show the following result.
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Figure 1: Braess graph instance for proving hardness of equivalence determination.
Theorem 5.5. Any deterministic algorithm that determines ǫ-equivalence for ǫ ≤ 1/16 requires an
exponential number of queries.
Our proof of the theorem is based on a particular property exhibited by the Braess graph shown in
Figure 1: there exist demands d1 ≤ d2 that depend on the parameters a and b so that for any demand
d < d1 and d > d2 the set of shortest-path edges is the same, and differs from the set of shortest-path
edges for any demand d1 ≤ d ≤ d2. This is formalized by the following claim.
Claim 5.6. For the routing game depicted in Figure 1, and any d1, d2 ∈ R+ with d2 > d1 ≥ 1,
there exist parameters a and b so that the equilibrium flow f on the Braess edge is strictly positive
iff d1 < d < d2, where d is the demand being routed. Further, if d2 − d1 ≥
√
2(d1 + d2), then
fuv ≥ 1/12 for demand d = (d1 + d2)/2.
Proof. We choose a = 1 + (d1 + d2)/2 and b = (d1d2)/4. Then for any d, consider the flow that
routes d/2 on the s-u-t path and d/2 on the s-v-t path. It is easy to verify that this is the equilibrium
flow if and only if d ≤ d1 or d ≥ d2. Given the symmetric delay functions, it is then apparent that for
d ∈ (d1, d2) the (u, v) edge must have strictly positive flow.
For the second part of the proof, let σ = d1+d2, δ = d2−d1. Thus a = 1+σ/2, b = (σ2−δ2)/16,
and d = σ/2 = a− 1. Let fsu = x. Then by the symmetry of the delay functions fsv = fut = d− x
and fuv = 2x−d. Since we know for this demand fuv > 0, and edge (s, v) has zero delay if fsv = 0,
lsu(f) + luv(f)− lsv(f) = 0. Hence
0 = x2 + x+ b− a(d− x)
and solving for fuv = 2x− d, and substituting the values of a, b and d yields
2x− d =
√
(a+ 1)2 + 4(ad− b)− (a+ 1 + d) = x2 + (a+ 1)x+ (b− ad)
=
√
(2 + σ)2 + δ2/4− (2 + σ) .
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Using the fact that
√
1 + x ≥ 1 + x/3 for |x| ≤ 1 by the Taylor expansion, we get
2x− d ≥ δ
2
12(2 + σ)
Since δ ≥ √2σ ≥ √2 + σ by assumption, this completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 5.5. We demonstrate that on the Braess graph in Figure 1 with an additional (s, t)
edge, demand d > 8, and where a, b have value O(d2), any algorithm requires Ω(
√
d) queries to
determine if two sets of delay functions l1, l2 are equivalent. Since the size of the input is O(log d),
this would prove the lemma.
For delay functions l1 that are explicitly given, a = 1, b = ∞ and l1st = ∞. Delay functions
l2 also have l2st = ∞ but different values for a and b, which are determined after seeing the queries.
Let gi, i ≤ k be the set of queries. We will show that if k ≤ √d then there exist a, b so that
f(l1, gi) = f(l2, gi) for all i ≤ k, but there exists g so that fuv(l2, gi) ≥ 1/12. Since l1uv = ∞, it
must be that fuv(l1, gi) = 0, and hence the two delay functions are distinct. Thus any algorithm that
makes less than
√
d must fail to distinguish between these delay functions.
For any query gi, our oracle returns the equilibrium flow f(l1, gi). Now given gi for i ≤ k ≤ √d,
let α1, α2 ∈ [1, d] be such that α2 − α1 ≥
√
d, and for all i, d− gist 6∈ [α1, α2]. Since edge (s, t) has
infinite delay, any flow on this edge must be Stackelberg flow. Hence we require α1 and α2 so that
the total flow on the Braess graph is always outside the interval [α1, α2], and α2 − α1 ≥
√
d. Since
k ≤ √d, such an interval must exist. We then select a and b as in Claim 5.6 to complete our definition
of delay function l2.
It remains to show that for all gi, f(l2, gi) = f(l1, gi) for correctness of the oracle. Fix i, and
let d′ = d − gist. Note that d′ 6∈ [α1, α2]. Let g1, g2 and g3 be the Stackelberg flow on paths s-u-t,
s-u-v-t, and s-v-t respectively. By our choice of l2, if g1 = g2 = g3 = 0, then the equilibrium flow
would split demand d′ equally between the s-u-t and s-v-t paths, and hence
l2sv(d
′/2) ≤ b+ l2su(d′/2) . (6)
We consider the following cases.
Case 1: Either g1 or g3 is strictly greater than (d′−g2)/2. Suppose g1 > (d′−g2/2). We claim that
at equilibrium, the non-Stackelberg demand is entirely routed on the s-v-t path, i.e., f(g) = h where
hsv(g) = hvt(g) = d
′ − (g1 + g2 + g3). To see this, note that hsv + gsv < d′/2, hence comparing
with (6), delay on the s-v-t path is less than the delay on the s-u-v-t. Further, hsv + gsv < gut, and
hvt+ gvt < gsu. By the symmetry of delay functions, the s-v-t path is therefore the shortest path, and
hence h = f(g).
Case 2: Both g1 and g3 are at most (d′ − g2)/2. We claim that at equilibrium, fsu(g) = fut(g)
= d′/2− (g1 + g2) and fsv(g) = fvt(g) = d′/2− (g3 + g2). Thus at equilibrium the remaining flow
d′ − g2 is divided equally between the s-u-t and s-v-t paths, and again the edge (u, v) has no flow at
equilibrium. To verify the claim, note that
fsv(g) + gsv ≤ fsu(g) + gsu = d′/2 and fut(g) + gut ≤ fvt(g) + gvt = d′/2
and hence, comparing with (6),
l2sv(f(g) + g) ≤ l2sv(f(g) + g) + b and l2ut(f(g) + g) ≤ l2vt(f(g) + g) + b .
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It is further easy to see that, since the total flow on edges (s, u), (v, t) is equal, and the total flow on
edges (s, v), (u, t) is equal,
l2sv(f(g) + g) + l
2
vt(f(g) + g) = l
2
su(f(g) + g) + l
2
ut(f(g) + g) .
Hence paths s-u-t and s-v-t are shortest paths with the described flow, and since fP (g) > 0 only on
these paths, it is an equilibrium.
As noted earlier, if the Stackelberg flow is rational, then so is f(g). In fact as shown the equilib-
rium flow in all cases is very simple and can be computed directly from g. 
We note that in our example, the equilibrium flow returned by the oracle is particularly simple and
in fact does not depend on the delay functions. E.g., in the simpler case in the proof sketch, the oracle
always returns fe(g) = (d− gst)/2 for all e 6= (s, t), (u, v).
Computational complexity. We now show that even if delay functions l1 and l2 are given explicitly,
determining if they are ǫ-equivalent is computationally hard for ǫ ≤ 1/2. This is true even if all delay
functions are affine. Our proof uses properties of the Braess graph together with ideas from a reduction
from 2-Directed Disjoint Paths shown by Roughgarden [27].
Definition 5.7 (2-Directed Disjoint Paths (2DDP)). Given a directed graph G = (V,E) and two pairs
of terminals s1,t1 and s2, t2, determine if there exist si-ti paths pi so that p1 and p2 are vertex-disjoint.
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Figure 2: Braess graph instance for proving hardness of equivalence determination with respect to
Stackelberg routing.
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Figure 3: 2DDP instance with additional edges for proving hardness of equivalence determination
with respect to Stackelberg routing.
Theorem 5.8. The problem of determining the ǫ-equivalence of delay functions for ǫ ≤ 1/2 is NP-
hard.
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We use the following claim about Stackelberg routing in the Braess graph.
Claim 5.9. In any Stackelberg routing instance on the graph with delay functions l as in Figure 2 and
Stackelberg routing g, if fuv(g) > 0, then d < 2 and D(l, g) ≤ 2. Further, if ge = 0 for every edge in
the Braess graph and the demand d ∈ [1/2, 3/2], then fuv(g) ≥ 1/2.
Proof. For the first part of the claim, het h = f(l, g) + g. If (u, v) ∈ S(l, g), then the path p =
(s, u, v, t) must be a shortest path for flow h. Then lsu(h) + luv(h) ≤ lsv(h), and hence lsu(h) ≤ 1.
Thus hsu ≤ 1. Similarly, hvt ≤ 1. The first part follows. For the second part, if d ≤ 1 it is easy to see
that the equilibrium flow routes the entire demand on the s-u-v-t path. If d ∈ [1, 2] then consider the
flow hsu = hvt = 1, huv = 2− d and hsv = hut = d− 1. It can be verified that h is the equilibrium
flow. 
Proof of Theorem 5.8. We show a reduction from 2DDP. Given an instance of the 2DDP problem, af-
ter the addition of a source s and a sink t and additional edges described next (and shown in Figure 3),
we add this graph in parallel with a standard Braess graph (Figure 2). The delay functions l1, l2 will
differ only on edge (u, v) in the Braess graph. We use H1 to refer to the Braess graph and H2 to refer
to the graph in the 2DDP instance with vertices s and t and the additional edges, and H to refer to
their parallel composition. For a flow f , |fHi | is the value of the flow in subgraph Hi.
The specifics of the construction are as follows. Let m = |E| be the number of edges in the given
instance of 2DDP. All of these edges have delay function x/m2. We add a source s, vertex s′ and
a sink t. We add an edge (s, s′) with constant delay function 1/8, and edges (s′, si) and (ti, t) for
i ∈ {1, 2}. Edges (s, s1) and (t2, t) have delay function x, while edges (s, s2) and (t1, t) have delay
function 1. Further, there is an (s, t) edge with delay function ∞, and for every edge e = (x, y) in the
original instance, the new instance additionally contains edges (s, x) and (y, t) with delay function
∞. This constitutes the graph H2. Graph H1 consists of the Braess graph instance in Figure 2, and
graph H is obtained by a parallel composition of H1 and H2. The Stackelberg instance has demand
m4 + 3, and α = m4/(3 +m4). The delay functions l1, l2 are as described, except l2uv = ∞ on the
Braess edge.
Since l1, l2 differ only on the delay function on edge (u, v), it is easy to see that for any Stackelberg
routing g, if fuv(l1, g) = 0 then fuv(l1, g) = fuv(l2, g). Further, since l2uv = ∞, if fuv(l1, g) =
fuv(l
2, g) then in fact fuv(l1, g) = 0. Hence the delay functions are equivalent iff fuv(l1, g) = 0 for
every Stackelberg routing g. For the proof of the theorem, we will show that if the instance of 2DDP
is a positive instance, then there exists a Stackelberg routing g so that fuv(l1, g) ≥ 1/2, otherwise for
any Stackelberg routing, fuv(l1, g) = 0.
In the remainder of the proof we focus on delay functions l1. Suppose that the instance is a
positive instance. Then the Stackelberg routing g sends m3 units of flow on every edge e = (x, y)
in the original instance that is not on the vertex-disjoint paths pi, using the additional edges (s, v),
(v,w). Any remaining Stackelberg flow is routed on the (s, t) edge. Thus every edge that is not on
the vertex-disjoint paths now has delay at least m, while ge = 0 for every edge on the vertex-disjoint
paths. Further, ge = 0 for every edge e ∈ H1.
We claim that for the equilibrium flow, 1/2 ≤ |fH1 | ≤ 3/2. To see this, if |fH1 | < 1/2, then the
delay at equilibrium inH1 is at most 1. However |fH2 | > 5/2, hence at least one of the two s-t parallel
paths has delay at equilibrium greater than 1. If |fH1 | > 3/2 then the delay at equilibrium in H1 is 2.
However, |fH2 | ≤ 3/2, hence at least one of the two s-t parallel paths has delay at equilibrium less
than 1 + 1/8 + 3/4 × (1 + 1/m) < 2. Thus at equilibrium, 1/2 ≤ |fH1 | ≤ 3/2, and by Claim 5.9,
fuv(g) ≥ 1/2.
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Now suppose that for some Stackelberg routing g, fuv(g) > 0. Then by Claim 5.9, |fH1 | ≤ 2 and
the delay at equilibrium is at most 2. However, then |fH2 | ≥ 1 and the delay at equilibrium is at most
2. Since there is an (s, s′) edge with constant delay 1/8, following the proof of Theorem 5.11, this is
only possible if the instance of DDP is a positive instance. 
In fact, using very similar ideas, we can show that the problem of minimizing D(f(g)) over all
Stackelberg strategies is (4/3− ǫ)-inapproximable, even with linear delays. Roughgarden has shown
that finding the Stackelberg routing that minimizes the average delay of the total flow g + f(g) is
NP-hard, even in parallel links with affine delays [26]. Despite considerable interest in Stackelberg
routing, nothing stronger than NP-hardness is known for this problem. Our result thus shows that a
closely related problem is APX-hard.
Definition 5.10 (Stackelberg Equilibrium Delay Minimization (SEDM)). Given a Stackelberg routing
instance (G, l, (d, s, t), α), find the Stackelberg routing g that minimizes the average delay for the
equilibrium flow f(g).
Theorem 5.11. The SEDP problem is (4/3 − ǫ)-inapproximable, for any fixed ǫ > 0.
Proof. Given an instance of the 2DDP problem, we modify it to obtain a Stackelberg routing instance
as follows. Letm = |E| be the number of edges in the original instance. All of these edges have delay
function x/m2. We add a source s and a sink t, and edges (s, si) and (ti, t). Edges (s, s1) and (t2, t)
have delay function x, while edges (s, s2) and (t1, t) have delay function 1. Further, there is an (s, t)
edge with delay function ∞, and for every edge e = (v,w) in the original instance, the new instance
additionally contains edges (s, v) and (w, t) with delay function ∞. The Stackelberg instance has
demand m4 + 1, and α = m4/(1 +m4).
We claim that if the instance of 2DDP is a positive instance, then there exists a Stackelberg routing
g with D(l, f(g)) ≤ 3/2 + 1/m, otherwise for any Stackelberg routing, D(f(g)) ≥ 2. Suppose that
the instance is a positive instance. Then the Stackelberg routing g sends m3 units of flow on every
edge e = (v,w) in the original instance that is not on the vertex-disjoint paths pi, using the additional
edges (s, v), (v,w). Thus every edge that is not on the vertex-disjoint paths now has delay at least m,
while ge = 0 for every edge on the vertex-disjoint paths. Any remaining Stackelberg flow is routed
on the (s, t) edge. It is now easy to verify that the equilibrium flow f(g) splits one unit of demand
approximately equally between the two paths p1 and p2, and has a delay at equilibrium of at most
3/2 + 1/m.
Now suppose the given instance does not contain two vertex-disjoint paths between s1, t1 and
s2, t2. Following the argument in [4], for a contradiction let g be a Stackelberg routing for which
D(f(g)) < 2. Let F be the set of edges with positive flow at equilibrium. Then F must contain all
four edges (s, s1), (s, s2), (t1, t), (t2, t); the absence of any of these edges would give a delay of at
least 2. Further, F cannot contain an s-s2-t1-t path since again this would given delay of at least 2.
Hence F must contain an s-s1-t1-t path and an s-s2-t2-t path. These paths cannot be vertex disjoint;
let v be the common vertex. Then the delay on any s-v path must be at least 1, and the delay on any
v-t path must be at least 1. Hence the total delay in any instance that does not contain two vertex-
disjoint paths is at least 2, which gives us a contradiction. The hardness of determining the existence
of these paths thus shows that minimizing the delay of the equilibrium flow with Stackelberg routing
is (4/3 − ǫ) inapproximable, for any ǫ > 0. 
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A Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.2. The necessity of the first condition, that ge ≤ f∗e on every edge, is obvious. For
the necessity of the second condition, assume f∗ is an equilibrium flow and on some edge e 6∈ S,
ge < f
∗
e . Then fe(g) > 0 since f(g)+g = f∗. By definition of Wardrop equilibrium, then there must
exist a path P with e ∈ P and lP (f∗) ≤ lQ(f∗) for any path Q. This contradicts that e 6∈ S.
For the sufficiency of the conditions, consider the flow f∗ − g. This is strictly positive only on
shortest-path edges, and hence satisfies the conditions for Wardrop equilibrium with Stackelberg flow
g. Since the equilibrium is unique, f(g) = f∗ − g. 
B Proofs from Sections 3.1 and 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Let (G, l, (si, ti, di)i≤k) be the given routing game. Recall that we assume that
the les satisfy (2)–(4) with logK = poly(I). Recall the convex program (1) used to compute the
Wardrop equilibrium.
min Φ(f) :=
∑
e
∫ fe
0
le(x) dx s.t. f =
k∑
i=1
f i, f i is an si-ti flow of value di ∀i = 1, . . . , k.
(1)
Set δ = ǫ4mK and ε = min
{ ǫ(∑i di)
2 ,
δ2
2K2
}
. Let fˆ be the Wardrop equilibrium, and g be a feasible
flow such that Φ(g) ≤ Φ(fˆ) + ε that we compute in time poly(I, log(1
ε
)
)
= poly
(I, log(1
ǫ
)
)
. (We
will later require that g is computed via a specific algorithm for solving (1).)
First, we note that given any feasible flow g, one can always obtain an acyclic feasible flow g′ ≤ g
by simply canceling flow along flow-carrying cycles (of each commodity). So in the sequel, we ignore
the acyclicity condition and concentrate on obtaining an approximate equilibrium.
Observe that for any feasible flows h, f , we have Φ(h)−Φ(f) ≥ vf · (h− f), vf = (le(fe))e; vf
is called the subgradient of Φ at f . So we have∑
e
gele(fˆe)−
∑
i
diD
i(l, fˆ) =
∑
e
(ge − fˆe)le(fˆe) ≤ Φ(g) − Φ(fˆ) ≤ ε.
We show below that
∑
e(ge − fˆe)le(ge) ≤ δ
2
K
. Since fˆ is an equilibrium, we also have
∑
e(fˆe −
ge)le(fˆe) ≤ 0. Adding the two inequalities gives
∑
e(ge − fˆe)
(
le(ge) − le(fˆe)
) ≤ δ2
K
. Each term in
this sum is nonnegative and hence is at most δ2
K
, and therefore we have |ge − fˆe| ≤ δ for every edge e
(due to inverse-K-continuity). Given this, we have that lP (g) ≤ lP (fˆ)+mKδ due to the K-Lipschitz
condition, and so Di(l, g) ≤ Di(l, fˆ) +mKδ for every commodity i. Therefore,
∑
e
gele(ge) ≤
∑
e
gele(fˆe) +mKδ
(∑
i
di
)
≤
∑
i
di
(
Di(l, fˆ) +mKδ
)
+ ε
≤
∑
i
di
(
Di(l, g) + 2mKδ
)
+ ε ≤
∑
i
di
(
Di(l, g) + ǫ
)
.
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We now show that
∑
e(ge− fˆe)le(ge) ≤ δ
2
K
. Suppose we obtain the near-optimal solution to (1) by
running the ellipsoid method with error parameter ω = ε
mK
∑
i di
. This takes time poly
(I, log( 1
ω
)
)
=
poly
(I, log(1
ε
)
)
.) The near-optimality of g then follows from the fact that there exists another
feasible flow h satisfying: (i) ‖h − fˆ‖∞ ≤ ω, and so Φ(h) − Φ(fˆ) ≤
∑
e(he − fˆe)le(he) ≤
ωm(maxe le(he)) ≤ ωmK
∑
i di = ε; (ii)
∑
e(he − ge)le(ge) = 0; see, e.g., Sections 3 and 4 and
in particular, Lemma 4.5, in [31]. Thus, we have ∑e(fˆe − ge)le(ge) ≥ 0 − ωm(maxe le(ge)) ≥
−ωmK∑i di ≥ − δ2K . 
Definition of general nonatomic congestion games. This is the following generalization of nonatomic
routing games. The edge set is now replaced by a setE of resources, and there are k player-types. Each
resource e has a nonnegative, continuous, and strictly increasing delay function, le : R+ 7→ R+. Each
player-type i is described by a player-volume di and an explicitly-given non-empty strategy set Pi ⊆
2E . The combined strategy-choices of the infinitely-many infinitesimal players of each type i can be
described by an assignment f = (f1, . . . , fk), where f i : Pi 7→ R+ satisfies
∑
P∈Pi f
i
P = di; the
cost incurred by a strategy Q ∈ ⋃i Pi is then lQ(f) :=∑e∈Q le(fe), where fe =∑P∈⋃i Pi:e∈P f iP .
We define Di(l, f) and an ǫ-equilibrium as before: so Di(l, f) = minP∈Pi lP (f), and f is an ǫ-
equilibrium if
∑
e fele(fe) ≤
∑
i di(D
i(l, f) + ǫ). A Nash equilibrium or Nash assignment is a
0-equilibrium, and is known to be unique.
The question with tolls is whether one can impose tolls τ ∈ RE on resources—which, as before,
yield delay functions (lτe (x) := le(x) + τe)e—in order to achieve a target assignment f∗ as the Nash
assignment, or ensure that (f∗e )e is component-wise close to the Nash assignment.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We first recall the definition of a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium of the
atomic splittable routing game is a feasible flow f such that
∑
e f
i
ele(fe) ≤
∑
e g
i
ele(fe − f ie + gie)
for every si-ti flow gi of value di. Equivalently, defining the marginal latency function li,e(f ;x) :=
le(x) + f
i
el
′
e(x), where l′(x) is the derivative of l, this means that if f iP > 0 for P ∈ Pi, then P is a
shortest si-ti path under the edge costs
(
li,e(f ; fe)
)
e
.
We use the ellipsoid method and dovetail the proof of Theorem 3.2. Given the current ellipsoid
center (lˆ, τˆ), we obtain a separating hyperplane as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, except that we use the
marginal delay functions
(
lˆτˆi,e
)
i,e
. Let g = f(l∗, τˆ) = (gi)i≤k be the flow returned by the oracle. If
gi = f∗i for all i, then we are done, so suppose otherwise. Suppose that f(lˆ, τˆ ) 6= f∗, that is, there
is some i such that f(lˆ, τˆ)i 6= f∗i. Note that this can be efficiently determined. We can find a player
j and paths P,Q ∈ Pj such that f∗jP > 0, but
∑
e∈P lˆ
τˆ
j,e(f
∗; f∗e ) >
∑
e∈Q lˆ
τˆ
j,e(f
∗; f∗e ). Thus, the
inequality ∑
e∈P
lj,e(f
∗; f∗e ) + τ(P ) ≤
∑
e∈Q
lj,e(f
∗; f∗e ) + τ(Q)
where both l and τ are variables is violated by (lˆ, τˆ ) but satisfied by (l∗, τ∗) since (l∗, τ∗) induce f∗
(by definition). Notice that the above inequality is indeed linear in l and τ .
Now suppose f(lˆ, τˆ)i = f∗i for all i. Then, g 6= f∗, we can again find a player j and paths
P,Q ∈ Pj such that gjP > 0, but
∑
e∈P lˆ
τˆ
j,e(g; ge) >
∑
e∈Q lˆ
τˆ
j,e(g; ge). So consider the inequality∑
e∈P
lj,e(g; ge) + τˆ(P ) ≤
∑
e∈Q
lj,e(g; ge) + τˆ(Q)
where now only the les are variables. This is violated by (lˆ, τˆ ) but satisfied by (l∗, τ∗) since g =
f(l∗, τˆ). 
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C Proofs from Section 3.3
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3.13
As mentioned in the proof sketch, we first show a property that is weaker than having a discriminating
pair. To this end, we define a good pair of subgraphs (Definition C.1) and first show in Lemma C.2
that a pair of subgraphs satisfying this weaker property always exist.
Let (G, {(si, ti, di)}i∈K) be a multicommodity flow instance on a sepa graph. Let H be the col-
lection of parallel subgraphs of G under a given sepa decomposition tree for G. For any subgraph
H ∈ H we define the internal nodes of H as V int(H) := V (H) \ {sH , tH}. The internal commodi-
ties of H are Kint(H) := {i ∈ K : {si, ti} ∩ V int(H) 6= ∅}. The external commodities of H are
Kext(H) := {i ∈ K : sH , tH lie on some si-ti path}.
Let f = (f i)i∈K and f˜ = (f˜ i)i∈K be two feasible multicommodity flows. Define
|f iH | :=
∑
e=(sH ,v)∈E(H)
f ie , and |fH | :=
∑
i∈Kext(H)
|f iH | .
Definition C.1. Given feasible flows f , f˜ in G, subgraphs H1,H2 are (f, f˜ ,H)-good if:
(i) the parallel-join of H1 and H2 is a subgraph in H;
(ii) fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H1) and fe ≤ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H2); and
(iii) |fH1 | > |f˜H1 | and |fH2 | < |f˜H2 |.
Lemma C.2. For any subgraph H of G, letH′ be the set of subgraphs of H obtained by parallel joins
in a given decomposition tree of G, and let f , f˜ be feasible multicommodity flows in G. Either there
exists an (f, f˜ ,H′)-good pair of subgraphs or one of the following must hold.
1. If |fH | = |f˜H | then fe = f˜e for all e ∈ E(H).
2. If |fH | > |f˜H | then fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H).
3. If |fH | < |f˜H | then fe ≤ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the size ofH . In the base case, whenH is a single edge, there is no
good pair of subgraphs, but one of the three cases clearly holds. For the induction step, suppose H is
the join of subgraphs H1 andH2. IfH is the parallel join ofH1 andH2, then any external commodities
of H are external commodities of H1 and H2 as well; similarly, any external commodities of H1 and
H2 are external commodities of H as well. Hence |fH | = |fH1 | + |fH2 |. Note that if |fHi | > |f˜Hi |
and |fHj | < |f˜Hj | for i 6= j and i, j ∈ {1, 2} then H1 and H2 form a good pair.
To verify the three cases, suppose |fH | = |f˜H |. If |fHi | = |f˜Hi | for i ∈ {1, 2}, then by induction
fe = f˜e for e ∈ E(H). Otherwise, by the induction hypothesis for i 6= j and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, |fHi | >
|f˜Hi | and |fHj | < |f˜Hj | yielding a good pair. If |fH | > |f˜H | then again, either |fHi | > |f˜Hi | and
|fHj | < |f˜Hj | yielding a good pair, or |fHi | > |f˜Hi | and |fHj | = |f˜Hj |. In this case, by induction,
fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H).
Now suppose H1 and H2 are in series. In this case, note that Kext(H) ⊆ Kext(Hi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Further, if commodity i ∈ Kext(H1) but i 6∈ Kext(H), then ti must be an internal node of H2. Since
every si-ti path contains sH1 , and f , f˜ are feasible flows in G, |f iH1 | = |f˜ iH1 |. Similarly, if commodity
i ∈ Kext(H2) but i 6∈ Kext(H), then si must be an internal node ofH1. Since every si-ti path contains
sH2 , |f iH2 | = |f˜ iH2 |. Thus,
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|fH1 | − |f˜H1 | =
∑
i∈Kext(H1)∩Kext(H)
(
|f iH1 | − |f˜ iH1 |
)
+
∑
i∈Kext(H1)\Kext(H)
(
|f iH1 | − |f˜ iH1 |
)
=
∑
i∈Kext(H1)∩Kext(H)
(
|f iH1 | − |f˜ iH1 |
)
=
∑
i∈Kext(H)
(
|f iH1 | − |f˜ iH1 |
)
= |fH | − |f˜H |
Similarly, |fH2 | − |f˜H2 | = |fH | − |f˜H |. By induction, either there is a good subgraph, or one of
the three cases in the lemma must hold. 
Proof of Lemma 3.13. Since f and f˜ are feasible multicommodity flows and f 6= f˜ , Lemma C.2
implies that there is an (f, f˜ ,H)-good pair of subgraphs H1, H2. So (a) fe ≥ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H1)
and fe ≤ f˜e for all e ∈ E(H2), and (b) |fH1 | > |f˜H1 | and |fH2 | < |f˜H2 |. If fe > f˜e for all
e ∈ E(H1), then we are done. So suppose otherwise.
In the fixed decomposition tree of G, consider the subgraphs in the subtree rooted at subgraph
H1. Let K be a minimal subgraph that contains both fe > f˜e edges and fe = f˜e edges; that is,
every subgraph of K only contains fe > f˜e edges or fe = f˜e edges but not both. Let K be the
join of K1 and K2, where K1 contains fe > f˜e edges. If K1, K2 are in parallel, then K1,K2 is an
(f, f˜ ,H)-discriminating pair.
To complete the proof, we show that it cannot be that K1 and K2 are in series. Let v be the node
joining K1 and K2, so all edges with v at their head lie in E(K1), and all edges with v at their tail lie
in E(K2). Given a feasible multicommodity flow h, define bv(h) =
∑
(v,u)∈E hv,u −
∑
(u,v)∈E hu,v.
Observe that bv(h) is simply the node balance
∑
i:v=si
di −
∑
i:v=ti
di, and is thus independent of
the multicommodity flow. Therefore, bv(f) = bv(f˜). Rearranging, this gives
∑
e∈E(K1):e=(u,v)
(fe −
f˜e) =
∑
e∈E(K2):e=(v,u)
(fe − f˜e), which is a contradiction. 
D Proofs from Section 3.4
Proof of Claim 3.17. We assume that in τ , there is a single edge e′ = (u,w) with negative tolls. If
there are multiple such edges, simply repeating the procedure in this proof gives the required tolls τ ′.
If fe′(τ) = 0, increasing the toll on this edge does no change the equilibrium flow. Hence we assume
that fe′(l, τ) > 0.
Let E+ be the edge set of the graph if it is acyclic; otherwise, let E+ be the set of edges with
strictly positive flow in g = f(l, τ). Since g is an equilibrium flow, the set of edges E+ is acyclic.
Let σ(v) be an ordering of the vertices given by a topological sort of the graph (V,E+). Define
S = {v ∈ V : σ(v) ≤ σ(u)}, where e′ = (u, v) is the edge with negative toll. Then s ∈ S and
t ∈ V \ S. Let τ ′ be the tolls obtained by adding −τe′ to every edge e 6∈ E+, and also to every edge
e = (x, y) ∈ E+ across the cut (S, V \ S). That is,
τ ′xy =
{
τxy − τe′ if x ∈ S, y ∈ V \ S, or (x, y) 6∈ E+
τxy otherwise.
By this procedure, the toll does not decrease on any edge and increases to zero on edge e′. We claim
that the flow at equilibrium remains unchanged. Consider first a path P with gP > 0. All edges
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e ∈ P are in E+, and exactly one edge crosses the cut (S, V \S). Hence the delay on every such path
increases by exactly −τe′. On any other path, there is at least one edge e 6∈ E+, hence the delay these
paths increases by at least −τe′. The flow g is thus a flow on shortest paths with tolls τ ′, and hence
g = f(l, τ ′). 
Proof of Theorem 3.18. We first prove (iii). Let τ := 1rδ. Let Φ be the potential function as defined
in (1) for the delay functions in Γ , and Φτ be the potential function with delay functions that include
the toll τ . Note that for any flow f , Φτ (f) = Φ(f) + τrfr. Suppose for a contradiction that fr(τ) >
fr(0). Then
Φτ (f(0)) = Φ(f(0)) + τrfr(0) < Φ(f(0)) + τrfr(τ) < Φ(f(τ)) + τrfr(τ) = Φ
τ (f(τ)) .
But this is a contradiction, since f(τ) is the unique minimizer of Φτ .
We now prove part (iv) of the theorem. Let τ := −1rδ. We first prove the lemma for the case that
S(l, f(τ)) = S(l, f(0)), and then extend it to the case when the set of shortest-path edges differ. For
two flows f and g of the same value in G, the difference h = f − g is a circulation and is possibly
negative on some edges. If huv > 0 then (u, v) is a forward edge, and if huv < 0 then (u, v) is a
backward. We use E+ and E− for the set of forward and backward edges respectively.
We want to define a decomposition of h along cycles. For this, let D be the directed graph with
the same vertex set as G, but with (u, v) ∈ E(D) if (u, v) ∈ E and huv > 0, and (v, u) ∈ E(D) if
(u, v) ∈ E and huv < 0. Then h defines a circulation h˜ in graph D, where h˜uv = huv if (u, v) is
a forward edge, and h˜vu = −huv if (u, v) is a backward edge. Let {h˜C}C∈C be a decomposition of
h˜ along directed cycles in D. Then for (u, v) ∈ E+, huv =
∑
C:(u,v)∈C h˜C , and for (u, v) ∈ E−,
huv = −
∑
C:(v,u)∈C h˜C .
Let edge r = (x, y). We will show that (y, x) is in every cycle C . For a contradiction, suppose
there exists C ′ ∈ C so that (y, x) 6∈ C ′. For any edge e ∈ E+, fe(τ) > fe(0), and for any edge
e ∈ E−, fe(τ) < fe(0). Further, since S(f(0)) = S(f(τ)), the sum of latencies along cycle C ′ must
be zero for both flows f(τ) and f(0). However,
∑
e∈C′
le(fe(τ)) =
∑
e∈E+∩C′
(le(fe(τ)) + τe)−
∑
e∈E−∩C′
(le(fe(τ)) + τe)
>
∑
e∈E+∩C′
(le(fe(0)) + τe)−
∑
e∈E−∩C′
(le(fe(0)) + τe)
≥
∑
e∈E+∩C′
le(fe(0)) −
∑
e∈E−∩C′
le(fe(0)) = 0 .
where the second inequality is because τe = 0 for e 6= r, and r 6∈ E− ∩ C ′. This is a contradiction,
since the sum of latencies along cycle C ′ must be zero for flow f(τ). Thus, for every cycle C ∈ C,
(y, x) must be in C .
Then
fuv(τ) = fuv(0) +
∑
C∈C:(u,v)∈C
fC −
∑
C∈C:(v,u)∈C
fC .
Since by the claim edge r is a backward edge in every cycle C ∈ C, |fr(τ)−fr(0)| = |
∑
C∈C fC |,
which is obviously an upper bound on the change in flow on any edge.
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We now extend the lemma for the case where S(f(0)) 6= S(f(τ)). In fact, we show that for any
ǫ > 0, |fr(τ) − fr(0)| ≥ ‖f(τ) − f(0)‖∞ − ǫ. Pick ν = ǫ2/(Kd22m), where m is the number of
edges. Let a0 = 0. For any ai we define
bi = sup{x ∈ [ai, δ] : S(f(−1rx)) = S(f(−1rai))} .
and ai+1 = bi + ν. Let j be such that δ ∈ [aj , aj+1]. By definition, either δ = bj or δ ∈ [bj , aj+1].
Since the number of possible sets of shortest-path edges is 2m, j ≤ 2m. Also, for all i, by the first
part of the lemma and by continuity of equilibrium flow, |fr(−1rai) − fr(−1rbi)| ≥ ‖f(−1rai) −
f(−1rbi)‖∞. Further by Corollary 3.19, ‖f(−1rbi)− fr(−1rai+1)‖ ≤
√
Kdν. Summing up,
‖f(0)− f(−1rδ)‖∞ ≤
j∑
i=0
‖f(−1rai)− f(−1rai+1)‖∞
≤
j∑
i=0
‖f(−1rai)− f(−1rbi)‖∞ +
j∑
i=0
‖f(−1rbi)− f(−1rai+1)‖∞
≤
j∑
i=0
|fr(−1rai)− fr(−1rbi)|+ 2m
√
Kdν
≤ |fr(0)− fr(−1rδ)| + ǫ
where the last inequality follows be the monotonicity of fr as a function of the toll on edge r. By
taking limits, ‖f(0)− f(τ)‖∞ ≤ |fr(0)− fr(τ)|. 
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